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A SIMPLE THEORY OF COMPLEX VALUATION
Anthony J. Casey* & Julia Simon-Kerr**
Complex valuations of assets, companies, government programs, damages,
and the like cannot be done without expertise, yet judges routinely pick an
arbitrary value that falls somewhere between the extreme numbers suggested
by competing experts. This creates costly uncertainty and undermines the le-
gitimacy of the court. Proposals to remedy this well-recognized difficulty have
become increasingly convoluted. As a result, no solution has been effectively
adopted and the problem persists. This Article suggests that the valuation di-
lemma stems from a misconception of the inquiry involved. Courts have
treated valuation as its own special type of inquiry distinct from traditional
fact-finding. We show that reintroducing fundamental principles of fact-find-
ing can provide a simpler and more accurate method of complex valuation.
Our conclusion rests on the premise that valuations are nothing more than
exercises in routine fact-finding. Valuation is not an ethereal question with no
right answer. Rather, valuation is a process of inferring the value that a rele-
vant community places on an asset. This basic point has been ignored in prac-
tice and received almost no attention in the academy. Recognizing this
foundational point can both restore the legitimacy of the process and reduce
the costs of uncertainty and biased testimony. We demonstrate that a return to
traditional evidentiary rules, including attention to burdens of proof, will dis-
courage courts from resorting to ad hoc calculations and will encourage courts
to arrive at valuations through vetted methodologies that are shown to be
reasonably accurate and, most importantly, supported by the record. We fur-
ther show that this will lead to an improvement in the quality of information
provided by expert witnesses.
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Introduction
California’s prison population reached nearly 200 percent of capacity
over an eleven-year period leading up to 2009.1 Among the physical indigni-
ties and deficiencies in medical care associated with such overcrowding, “as
many as 54 prisoners” shared a single toilet.2 In proceedings designed to
identify a remedy for this conceded Eighth Amendment violation, the state
of California argued that a reduction to 145 percent of capacity over two
years would be constitutionally adequate.3 The plaintiffs, meanwhile, identi-
fied a reduction to 130 percent of capacity as the minimum needed to “allow
the state sufficient room to run their medical system.”4 A three-judge panel
concluded that California had to reduce its prison population to 137.5 per-
cent of the prison’s design capacity within two years.5 The court explained
that it arrived at this number because it was “halfway between the cap re-
quested by plaintiffs and the wardens’ estimate of the California prison sys-
tem’s maximum operable capacity.”6 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld this
decision.7
In 2011, Daniel Bruckner, the owner of thirty-six parcels of rental prop-
erty, ran into difficulties meeting his tax burden and filed for personal bank-
ruptcy.8 Bruckner owed money to Fannie Mae in connection with three of
his multimillion-dollar properties.9 In bankruptcy proceedings, both Bruck-
ner and Fannie Mae introduced expert testimony on the value of the proper-
ties at issue.10 The bankruptcy court determined that each property’s value
was exactly halfway between the values proposed by the competing experts.11
The court’s stated rationale for these valuations was that “where there [are]
two appraisers, both of whom are competent . . . I’ve . . . on some occasions
1. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923–24 (2011).
2. Id. at 1924.
3. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 964, 967–69 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
4. Transcript of Plaintiff’s Closing Argument at 2914, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922
F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (Nos. C 01-1351, S-90 0520), 2009 WL 8413213 (explaining
that the 130 percent figure originated in internal state documents and was supported by nu-
merous experts).
5. Coleman, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 1003.
6. Id. at 969–70.
7. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 1910.
8. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Bruckner, 489 B.R. 93, 95–96 (E.D. Wis. 2012).
9. Id. at 95.
10. Id. at 102.
11. Id.
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gone somewhere in the middle.”12 The bankruptcy court’s ruling was upheld
on appeal.13
These seemingly disparate examples illustrate a common phenomenon
that arises when courts face the task of valuing complex assets, entitlements,
and claims. In such cases, it has become routine for courts to eschew exper-
tise and valuations grounded in research and mathematical models in favor
of the middle ground. To the extent that judges attempt to be scientific in
finding an alternative to numbers proposed by experts, they generally em-
ploy a mathematical technique most judges have mastered by the sixth
grade—averaging. Judges seek compromise because they are often con-
fronted with skewed valuations from biased experts. While middle ground
outcomes are palatable solutions, they have no inherent claim to legitimacy
or accuracy in any given complex valuation case. In addition, despite courts’
assertions to the contrary, it is generally possible to find an objective value
for an asset using best practices in an area or industry. Typically, that value
will be neither a random number in between the two expert opinions nor
the exact average of dueling expert figures. This is especially true given that
experts currently have every incentive to inflate or deflate their valuations
knowing that courts will generally come out somewhere near the middle.
This Article contends that the most accurate valuations in complex valu-
ation cases will, of necessity, come from the use of state-of-the-art valuation
techniques introduced by highly trained experts. In most cases, therefore, a
judge should—consistent with the traditional notion of evidentiary bur-
dens—choose one of the valuation methodologies offered by the parties’
experts, or find that the party with the burden of proof has failed to meet
that burden. If a judge reaches a valuation without support in the record, the
valuation has no legal or factual basis and should not be upheld on appeal.
This Article proposes that the solution to the valuation quagmire is not first
principles of division, but rather first principles of fact-finding.
It is no secret that courts are ill equipped to perform complex valua-
tions—at least on their own.14 As a result, valuation has become its own
industry within the world of complex litigation, in both civil and criminal
12. Transcript of Hearing at 182, In re Bruckner, No. 12-20027 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. June
11, 2012), ECF No. 218.
13. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 489 B.R. at 103.
14. See, e.g., John W. Hill et al., Increasing Complexity and Partisanship in Business Dam-
ages Expert Testimony: The Need for a Modified Trial Regime in Quantification of Damages, 11
U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 297, 336 (2009) (“Most often, judges are not experts in financial theory or
valuation methodologies. This had [sic] led to frequent compromises in order to make deci-
sions in a reasonably efficient manner . . . . ”); Stephen J. Leacock, The Anatomy of Valuing
Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Pursuing the Phantom of Objectivity into the New Millen-
nium, 2001 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 161, 167–68 (2001) (“Very often, judges are not experts in
financial theory and as a result, courts have very frequently struck a compromise . . . [with] no
conceptual, theoretical or intellectually convincing basis . . . . ”).
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contexts.15 This industry reaches a wide range of legal disputes. Courts rou-
tinely rely on experts to assist them in valuing corporations,16 financial as-
sets,17 tax liability,18 tort and civil rights damages,19 and even the costs or
benefits of entitlements such as public education.20 Because the valuation
process is embedded in our traditional adversarial system, it often requires
courts to assess the merits of competing experts who may function more as
advocates than informative experts.21
In general, the use of experts in litigation creates a set of legal and philo-
sophical dilemmas that have—as Judge Learned Hand pointed out—troub-
led courts, lawyers, and scholars for centuries.22 Complex valuation cases
introduce an added dimension: they require mathematical models. Experts
identify the best methodology for assessing value, as well as the variables
that must be determined for the methodology to be successful. The experts
then perform the ultimate mathematical analysis.23 But despite the variabil-
ity of expert quality and statistics themselves, courts regularly respond to
complex valuation cases by assigning a value that often falls at an arbitrary
point somewhere in between the experts’ high and low values.24 The experts’
15. See, e.g., In re 3dfx Interactive, Inc., 389 B.R. 842 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2008) (using
competing expert valuations to determine if fair market value was paid for assets); Bernier v.
Bernier, 873 N.E.2d 216 (Mass. 2007) (providing an example of expert valuation to determine
value of business during divorce proceedings); State v. Zapien, No. 19845-6-III, 2002 Wash.
App. LEXIS 386, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2002) (making use of a valuation expert to
determine value of stolen property in criminal trial). We focus primarily on civil courts in this
paper. The analysis carries over to the criminal context, with the caveat that the different
burden of proof changes some of the practical outcomes discussed in Part II.
16. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Student Mktg. Litig., 598 F. Supp. 575 (D.D.C. 1984) (using
expert testimony to value entity involved in a merger); In re Chemtura Corp., 439 B.R. 561
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Albert Trostel & Sons Co. v. Notz, 679 F.3d 627 (7th Cir.
2012) (affirming district court’s order, which relied on expert valuations).
17. See, e.g., Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. AEP Power Mktg., Inc., 487 F.3d 89 (2d Cir.
2007) (assessing valuations from experts offered by both parties to determine the amount
owed on a contract).
18. See, e.g., Estate of Thompson v. Comm’r, 499 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 2007); Ferrari v.
Comm’r, 931 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1991); Estate of Litchfield v. Comm’r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1079
(2009); Willow St. Assocs. v. Bd. of Tax Assessment Review, 798 A.2d 896 (R.I. 2002) (using
experts to determine accuracy of assessed property value for tax purposes).
19. See, e.g., Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
20. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 971 A.2d 989 (N.J. 2009).
21. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 1113, 1119–25 (1991);
Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 174, 176–78 (2010); Keith
Sharfman, Valuation Averaging: A New Procedure for Resolving Valuation Disputes, 88 Minn. L.
Rev. 357, 358–60 (2003).
22. Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15
Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1902) (tracing the history and evolution of the treatment of expert
testimony).
23. See infra Section I.B.
24. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncer-
tainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 Yale L.J. 1930, 1953 (2006) (“In the absence of a
settlement, [judicial appraisal in bankruptcy] ‘splits the baby’ based on the judge’s determina-
tion of value, which may depart from what either the senior investor or the junior investor
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models set the outer limits and may provide an ex post justification of the
final judicial valuation.25 But they often play little role as actual analytical
tools to guide the court in reaching that value.26
This state of affairs is concerning to courts, scholars, and practitioners
alike. Some have argued that it lacks legitimacy and fails the requirements of
the rule of law.27 That can have major consequences for our justice system as
a whole.28 Others have highlighted its negative practical consequences. They
suggest it creates incentives for experts to exaggerate their value estimates.
This leads to an arms race among litigants.29 One might expect this to result
in litigants abandoning experts as a useless expense altogether. But our sys-
tem’s sticky procedural rules require a party to put at least something into
evidence to make each part of its case. While litigants can introduce market
information, tax returns, and other data pertaining to the value of assets,
without more, there is nothing to translate those raw numbers into a valua-
tion. Admissible expert testimony fills that evidentiary void.30 Moreover, the
party with the weak case has every incentive to introduce the skewed evi-
dence. And the party on the other side, knowing that courts tend to average
the evidence, will respond in kind. There is a de facto penalty for presenting
reasonable evidence. In the extreme scenario, expert testimony becomes an
thinks the business is worth.”); Robertson, supra note 21, at 191 (arguing that splitting the
difference does not resolve problem of offsetting expert biases); Kenton K. Yee, Dueling Experts
and Imperfect Verification, 28 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 246, 248, 254 (2008) (describing a game
theoretic model of expert valuation in which the judge is precommitted to “splitting the
baby”).
25. Yee, supra note 24, at 254.
26. The judge may not view the number as arbitrary, but to the extent that expertise
beyond the court’s skills is required to conduct the valuation it is hard to see how a number
chosen in this way will be anything but arbitrary unless it is simply an average of the two
numbers. See Hand, supra note 22, at 55; Sharfman, supra note 21, at 370.
27. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 21, at 1146.
28. See infra notes 102–105 and accompanying text for more on the rule of law and the
perils of illegitimacy.
29. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 21, at 1132, 1136; Robertson, supra note 21, at 191;
Sharfman, supra note 21, at 359; see also In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., No. 8080, 1990 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 199, at *14 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 1990) (noting that it was no surprise in our system
that the experts’ testimonies were flawed), aff’d sub nom. In re Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213
(Del. 1992). To be sure, the problem exists in other expert contexts as well. But the considera-
tions may be different. See infra Part III.
30. And often it is the only thing put into evidence. Parties may introduce data and other
evidence that support a valuation when analyzed. But often the relevance and foundation of
that evidence cannot be established without the expert testimony. See, e.g., Kent v. Flickinger,
453 F.2d 955, 958 (10th Cir. 1972) (“[N]o expert testimony [was] in the record from which a
separate valuation . . . could possibly have been made.”); Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi. v.
Bone, 333 F.2d 984, 988–89 (8th Cir. 1964) (“The Trustee’s claim that his cross-examination
of some of the witnesses establishes the valuation . . . is without merit. The Trustee offered no
expert testimony . . . . ”); In re IBM Credit Corp., 731 S.E.2d 444, 451 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012)
(rejecting a “hybrid” valuation proposal because it was not supported by expert testimony);
Bettinger v. Bettinger, 396 S.E.2d 709, 725 (W. Va. 1990) (“There is little doubt that in valuing
interest in pension and profit sharing plans or the value of a business or property which have
been found to be marital assets, expert witnesses are needed.”).
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uninformative process that imposes a cost on litigants and courts and creates
no social value.31
Thus, parties will continue to employ skewed experts. And they will
continue to have incentives to choose the most extreme experts that a court
will accept as qualified under Daubert.32 These bad incentives deepen the
legitimacy problem as experts—and the lawyers and courts that rely on
them—lose public trust.33
In addition to skewed incentives and legitimacy problems, the current
use of experts creates a transaction cost of uncertainty (or risk).34 If experts
provide no useful valuation information to courts, and judges have no ex-
pertise themselves, judicial valuations will have no relation to actual value.
This disconnect can make transactions more costly in three ways. First, in
some cases uncertainty can be costly itself ex ante.35 Second, once the parties
have entered into a transaction, their subsequent behavior will be distorted
by the uncertainty. Litigation that produces arbitrary results gives the party
with the weak position the possibility to recoup value from a judgment in its
favor without suffering losses from an adverse judgment.36 Third, uncer-
tainty skews the incentives of parties to use litigation as a dispute-resolution
mechanism. If other more accurate mechanisms are available, the party with
the better case will steer away from litigation, while the party with the worse
case will steer toward litigation. That may distort the parties’ choice of dis-
pute-resolution mechanism.37
31. See Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., No. 11107, 1995 WL 376911, at *9 (Del.
Ch. June 15, 1995) (finding a need to appoint a neutral expert to assess the parties’ experts and
imposing the cost of that expert on the parties); Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’ Ap-
praisal Remedy and how Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 Duke L.J. 613, 623, 630–31 (1998).
32. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert establishes a
“gatekeeping” role for the trial judge, who must determine whether the expert has scientific or
other specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or
determining a relevant fact. Under Daubert, trial judges consider factors such as whether the
expert’s methodology has been sufficiently tested, has been subjected to peer review and publi-
cation, has a low known or potential error rate, is subject to standards controlling its opera-
tion, and has achieved general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. Id. at 593–94.
33. Gross, supra note 21, at 1135 (describing cycle of contempt for the expert witness
system, leading good experts to opt out and reinforcing the perception by all involved that
experts are hired guns).
34. Here we use “uncertainty” to encompass both the concept of risk and uncertainty.
We unpack the important distinction between the two in Section I.C.2 below.
35. See, e.g., Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Stan-
dards, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 279 (1986). We discuss this below in Section I.C.1.
36. See infra Section I.C.2. See generally Sharfman, supra note 21 (noting that parties can
manipulate the process by offering dueling experts, which allows courts to arbitrarily decide
on a middle ground rather than impose all of the losses on the weaker party).
37. To the extent litigation has social value as a dispute-resolution mechanism, we should
be concerned with this distortion. See infra Section I.C.2. Especially where the alternative
mechanism is self-help, there is good reason to think that litigation has social value. See Adam
B. Badawi, Self-Help and the Rules of Engagement, 29 Yale J. on Reg. 1 (2012); cf. Owen M.
Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1984) (arguing that civil lawsuits benefit
the public more than settlements).
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Some have embraced a judicially determined valuation that falls some-
where between the experts’ numbers as a feasible solution to the problem of
self-serving expert testimony.38 According to this legal realist perspective,
many judges effectively follow the practice of splitting the difference, and
many appeals courts have long been willing to uphold arbitrary judicial
findings in this context despite significant doctrinal hurdles.39 Those who are
more skeptical have proposed modifications to how expert testimony is em-
ployed. One of the most popular proposed solutions is the court-appointed
expert.40 This suggestion—which fundamentally changes the role of the
judge and the advocates in determining complex facts—has gone largely un-
heeded by judges themselves, and so court-appointed experts remain a
novelty.41
This Article suggests a more fundamental solution that moves in the
opposite direction. Rather than separating complex valuation from the
38. See, e.g., Sharfman, supra note 21, at 370–71 (proposing a valuation averaging pro-
cess for arriving at a compromise value between those suggested by experts).
39. See, e.g., Swope v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., 243 F.3d 486 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding no clear
error after district court chose value within range of expert valuations where shareholders
dissenting to merger sued over valuation); Laird v. United States, 556 F.2d 1224, 1241 (5th Cir.
1977) (“[A] compromise figure—roughly midway between the positions of the parties—in no
way diminishes the validity of that valuation.”); United States v. 1,162.65 Acres of Land, 498
F.2d 1298, 1301 n.5 (8th Cir. 1974) (“[W]here the totality of the evidence supports the award
it will be upheld notwithstanding the fact it is outside the range of all the experts’ valua-
tions.”); Colonial Fabrics, Inc. v. Comm’r, 202 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1953). One court went as
far as reversing a district court for not using its discretion to conduct its own judicial valua-
tion. See Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. AEP Power Mktg., Inc., 487 F.3d 89, 112 (2d Cir.
2007).
40. This is proposed as a solution for the problem of self-serving experts more generally
and not just in the valuation context. See, e.g., Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting
Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity,
43 Emory L.J. 995, 1009 (1994) (suggesting that court-appointed experts are useful both in
leading to appropriate decisions on the merits and encouraging settlement); Ellen E. Deason,
Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets Bias and Deference, 77 Or. L. Rev.
59, 93 (1998) (“[T]he most helpful contribution a court-appointed expert can make to a ra-
tional decision is to analyze the conflicts between the party experts.”); Donna Tumminio,
Breaking Down Business Valuation: The Use of Court-Appointed Business Appraisers in Divorce
Actions, 44 Fam. Ct. Rev. 623 (2006) (describing how appointed appraisers are less costly,
more efficient, and lead to increased settlements, and should be used when party witnesses
would produce large disparities in valuation). But see Sophia Cope, Comment, Ripe for Revi-
sion: A Critique of Federal Rule of Evidence 706 and the Use of Court-Appointed Experts, 39
Gonz. L. Rev. 163, 195 (2004) (stating that court-appointed experts are a second-order solu-
tion and that their use should be more limited as judges develop a more sophisticated under-
standing of the scientific methods used by experts).
41. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 830 F. Supp. 686, 693 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y.
1993) (“A recent survey of trial judges conducted through the Federal Judicial Center revealed
that use of court-appointed experts under Rule 706 is relatively infrequent and that most
judges ‘view the appointment of an expert as an extraordinary activity that is appropriate only
in rare instances.’ ” (quoting Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Court-Appointed Ex-
perts: Defining the Role of Experts Appointed Under Federal Rule of Evidence 706
5 (1993))). Other proposed solutions include blind experts, outside intermediaries, and for-
mulaic combinations of divergent expert valuations. See Sharfman, supra note 21.
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traditional adversarial process, we propose to reunite it with the legal princi-
ples and safeguards of basic fact-finding. There is no fundamental difference
between inferring an evidentiary “fact” from the competing testimony of
various eyewitnesses, and inferring the market value of an asset from data
and the competing testimony of financial experts. Though the factors to be
considered may vary, both situations require a judge42 to measure the credi-
bility of witnesses who are testifying about circumstances beyond the judge’s
knowledge and expertise. And both require the judge to make factual infer-
ences based on those credibility determinations. And yet courts, lawyers, and
academics have constructed a false distinction between these two types of
inquiries. They are preoccupied with the purportedly unscientific nature of
valuations and the experts who conduct them, even though valuation deter-
minations involve the familiar process of drawing factual inferences from
evidence.
The conventional view that differentiates these two processes both
overcomplicates the judge’s role in the complex valuation and idealizes the
truth-finding role of the judge in the traditional case.43 Consider a car acci-
dent in Chicago: the fact finder has no more prior knowledge of what hap-
pened at Adams Street and Michigan Avenue at 9:00 p.m. on a Tuesday than
she does about the value of a clean-energy company at the time it filed for
bankruptcy.44 In the first case, the judge must assess the value of competing
eyewitness testimony or circumstantial evidence. In the second, she must
assess the value of competing expert models. Neither inference is more or
less “factual” than the other. And neither answer is more or less entitled to
the label “truth.”
We suggest the divergence stems from a theoretical and doctrinal vac-
uum. In this vacuum, the system has embraced an artificial and unnecessary
distinction between valuation based on expert testimony and run-of-the-
mill fact-finding. By filling that vacuum, we provide a reasoned and practi-
cal theory for complex valuation. We argue that complex valuation cases are
similar to cases that involve run-of-the-mill fact-finding. Courts must hear
testimony, review documents, weigh credibility, and make findings of fact
that are consistent with the record. Here, as in other areas, procedural mech-
anisms such as burdens of proof, limitations on admissible evidence, and the
basic requirement that verdicts be supported by the evidence should protect
the integrity of the judgment.
42. For simplicity and because most complex valuations occur before them, we focus on
judges as fact finders throughout most of this article. See infra Part IV for the distinctions
involved when a jury is doing the fact-finding.
43. On the interaction between truth and expert testimony, see Hand, supra note 22, at
55.
44. In the bankruptcy of the energy company Calpine Corporation, for example, the
parties asserted valuations ranging from $11.9 billion to $25.5 billion. The valuation dispute
turned on expert models and the predictions about various inputs into those models. Ulti-
mately, the case settled. Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option-Preservation Pri-
ority in Chapter 11, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 759, 801–02 n.167 (2011) (discussing the details of the
Calpine valuation dispute).
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As a practical matter, treating valuation questions as traditional ques-
tions of fact places greater emphasis on experts and their models. Viewing
complex valuation as an enterprise in traditional fact-finding will limit
courts to reaching valuations produced by a vetted methodology, not
through a judge’s back-of-the-envelope math or Excel manipulation.
Typically—though not always—this means that a judge must adopt one
of the valuation methodologies offered by the parties’ experts. If the judge is
satisfied with none of the proffered methodologies, she must instead find
that the party with the burden of proof has failed to meet that burden. This
does not mean that judges have no role in valuations other than to choose
one expert’s number or the other. Rather, judges must scrutinize the rele-
vance of the methodologies being applied and engage in fact-finding on the
credibility and the integrity of the variables going into the models being
used.
Furthermore, by limiting themselves to valuations supported by the fac-
tual record (the data, the experts, and their models) and by invoking the
burden of proof in cases in which they are unpersuaded by either expert,
judges will improve the incentives of litigants and their experts. This out-
come is akin to that achieved by final-offer arbitration mechanisms such as
“baseball arbitration.”45 At the risk of losing everything, the party with the
burden of proof will put on an expert with better credentials and a more
reasonable approach who can explain her methodology and justify her
choice of variables.46 In response, the other side will have every incentive to
present its own highly qualified, reasonable expert. Because the parties have
better incentives to put forth reasonable experts, the range of outcomes will
narrow around the accurate value. The ultimate valuation should become
more accurate in the sense that it better reflects current best practices for
valuing a particular asset and uncertainty problems will be diminished. In
turn, the court’s ultimate decision will be easier to review and the valuation
itself will have a legitimacy that is lacking under the current arbitrary
regime.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I presents the problem of un-
principled judicial valuation and its costs. Part II sets forth our proposal to
return complex valuation to the traditional fact-finding process and explores
the theoretical grounding and the practical applications of the approach.
45. The essential idea behind baseball arbitration is that each party makes one proposal
or a final offer. The arbitrator must then choose one of the two offers without discretion to
pick an intermediate value. If the arbitrator is instructed to pick the more reasonable offer, this
creates an incentive for the parties to make the offers reasonable. Henry S. Farber, An Analysis
of Final-Offer Arbitration, 24 J. Conflict Resol. 683, 683–84 (1980); Amy Farmer & Paul
Pecorino, Bargaining with Informative Offers: An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration, 27 J. Le-
gal Stud. 415, 415–16 (1998).
46. See Kohler Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 1032, 1037 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The [IRS]
could have justified a more modest estimate yet one well above $11.1 million, but clinging
stubbornly to its untenable valuation it suggested no alternative to $19.5 million. It played all
or nothing, lost all, so gets nothing.”).
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Part III explores broader implications of this analysis beyond complex valua-
tion, as well as its limitations.
I. Judicial Valuation Today
Our primary objective in this Article is to show that the judicial ap-
proach to complex valuation47 has strayed from first principles of fact-find-
ing. The resulting state of affairs is a theoretically unjustifiable process that
undermines judicial legitimacy and creates costly uncertainty.
A. A Theoretical Void
For the most part, courts and scholars have given lip service to the no-
tion that complex valuation is a type of objective fact-finding. The largely
unspoken assumption is that in complex valuations, as elsewhere, “the legal
system[ ] aspir[es] toward truth.”48 In keeping with this, contributors to the
literature on reforming complex valuations have generally sought measures
“that may help make our expert witnesses genuine contributors to the quest
for truth.”49
Relatedly, courts have a clear objective when they conduct valuations.
Just as in the binary case in which a court must determine whether the
defendant stole the wallet, in a complex valuation case the fact to be proved
is apparent. As one bankruptcy judge described it, “in determining an asset’s
value the ultimate goal remains . . . to determine as accurately as possible
what the sale price would be.”50 The goal of valuation is similarly straight-
forward in tax cases, in which the tax code typically requires the court to
determine the fair market value of the asset being transferred. While the tax
code provides simple formulae for determining that value in some circum-
stances, in other instances valuation depends on the hypothetical “value the
transferred interest in question would command had it been sold.”51 There
47. There is no theoretical distinction between simple and complex valuation. Instead,
they are best conceived of as occupying different positions on a spectrum of complexity. The
value of a collection of cash, for example, is one of the simplest cases. The court will need only
the factual testimony about precisely how much cash was in the collection. On the other end
of the spectrum, the going-concern value of a corporation in bankruptcy can often require
highly technical determinations that require the application of skills that are beyond the capac-
ity of a court or traditional factual witness. We focus primarily on the more complex cases in
this Article, but our ultimate proposal applies across the spectrum.
48. Robertson, supra note 21, at 182, 184 (arguing that, although there may not always
be an “exogenous truth,” the assumption that there is one has instrumental value and should
obtain in complex valuation cases).
49. Michael R. Devitt, A Dip in the Hot Tub: Concurrent Evidence Techniques for Expert
Witnesses in Tax Court Cases, 117 J. Tax’n 213, 214 (2012).
50. Christopher S. Sontchi, Valuation Methodologies: A Judge’s View, 20 Am. Bankr. Inst.
L. Rev. 1 (2012).
51. Jay A. Soled, Transfer Tax Valuation Issues, the Game Theory, and Final Offer Arbitra-
tion: A Modest Proposal for Reform, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 283, 284–85 (1997).
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is no doubt about the final objective—to determine the value an asset would
have on the market.
Thus, complex valuation, although it is often directed at assets that will
never be traded on a market, has a tangible goal: to find the closest approxi-
mation to what an asset is worth. That closest approximation is the value
that the relevant community places on the asset at the relevant time. This
approximation is the “accurate” value for the asset.
Consider a famous painting, for example. The painting is worth what
the highest bidder would pay for it in an auction. That is a real number—a
concrete fact. Until the auction, it is worth what one can reasonably predict
it would fetch. There are two ways to identify that number. First, we could
have an auction that sells the painting. But that option is impractical—espe-
cially if we are valuing it for purposes of an insurance payment after a fire,
for example. Second, we could find someone who is an expert in determin-
ing what potential buyers are likely to pay for a rare painting and ask that
expert what price the auction would likely produce.
In listening to the experts, of course, courts will often assess competing
methodologies used within the relevant community to identify value. But
that there are competing methodologies does not mean those methodologies
do not provide evidence of what price the auction would produce. It is true
that those methodologies may be the subject of intense debate and may
change over time. But the same is true of methods for determining other
facts. For example, scientific understanding of the reliability of eyewitness
testimony has been anything but static over the last few decades. In any
context, the legal system must grapple with conflicting evidence and the fact
finder must decide on the best information introduced at the time. In the
same way, at any given moment there is a “best” methodology that defines
the value that the relevant community places on an asset. That best method-
ology combined with accurate data should produce an “accurate” valuation.
Even as valuations proceed on the assumption that courts will invoke
the truth-seeking function of the judicial system in the service of identifying
a particular value, however, courts seem to disclaim the notion that accuracy
in complex valuations is even possible.52 Chief among such disclaimers is
one often repeated in the tax courts: “The determination of the fair market
value of property is a matter of judgment, rather than of mathematics.”53 In
other words, the consensus assumption that valuation is a truth-seeking en-
terprise like other fact-finding has meant little in practice, as courts have
treated valuation (either explicitly or through some sleight of hand) as a
unique type of inquiry that must be conducted outside the normal bounds
of reasoned judicial fact-finding.
52. We lay out our argument in Section I.B for holding to the assumption that valuation
is a way to arrive at a value that corresponds not to a random number selected by an inexpert
judge, but to the valuation produced by an expert applying an accepted valuation
methodology.
53. Buckley v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 754, 758 (1994).
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We suggest that this overlooked disjunction between the practice and
the theory of valuation is key to understanding and resolving the breakdown
of our system of complex valuations. Indeed, this very tension over whether
complex valuations are questions of fact or of law bubbled to the surface in a
recent debate at the U.S. Supreme Court. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend involved
an antitrust class action alleging that Comcast was attempting to monopo-
lize the cable market in Philadelphia.54 In certifying the class, the district
court found that only one of the plaintiffs’ four theories of antitrust impact
was capable of class-wide proof.55 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide whether the district court needed to do a more in-depth inquiry at
the certification stage in order to make a finding that the plaintiffs had ad-
missible evidence that would make clear that damages could be awarded on
a class-wide basis.56 The Court held that because the plaintiffs’ expert’s dam-
ages model encompassed all four of the initial antitrust theories offered and
did not identify the damages attributable to the one class-wide theory, it
could not establish that the putative damages of the proposed class were
susceptible to class-wide measurement.57
In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia included this enigmatic language
in a footnote:
The dissent is of the view that what an econometric model proves is a
“question of fact” . . . . [W]hile the data contained within an econometric
model may well be “questions of fact” in the relevant sense, what those data
prove is no more a question of fact than what our opinions hold.58
Unsurprisingly, given the lack of judicial or scholarly attention to this
particular question, the language was not supported by citation to prece-
dent. Nor did the majority explain whether the reasoning applied to valua-
tion models outside of the class certification context. It is possible that
Justice Scalia was simply referring here to the Daubert-like inquiry that must
be done before a model can be introduced for certification purposes. The
ambiguity lies in the word “what.”
To ask “what” the data prove is both to ask the general question of what
the model is useful for (is it a legitimate damages model?) and to ask what
output it provides (what specific damages number does it produce?).59 By its
plain language, the footnote may be read to state that valuation models
themselves are opinions on legal questions, and can therefore be reviewed,
overturned, or manipulated by courts at any level under their authority as
interpreters of the law. Under a more moderate reading, the footnote may
suggest simply that what a valuation model is capable of proving is not a
54. 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1430–31 (2013).
55. Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 532 F. Supp. 2d 735, 741–43 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
56. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1431.
57. Id. at 1434–35.
58. Id. at 1433 n.5 (emphasis added).
59. The dissent seems to reject the validity of all versions of interpreting this language.
See id. at 1440 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); infra note 60 and accompanying text.
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question of fact, but is instead the type of legal conclusion that deserves no
deference. Either way, the footnote is problematic because it embraces the
notion that in conducting valuations judges may alter or discard mathemati-
cal models entirely.
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent took issue with the majority’s characterization
of whether an expert’s model-based valuation constitutes a fact:
 The Court, however, concludes that “the model failed to measure dam-
ages resulting from the particular antitrust injury on which petitioners’
liability in this action is premised.” To reach this conclusion the Court
must consider fact-based matters, namely what this econometric multiple-
regression model is about, what it proves, and how it does so. And it must
overturn two lower courts’ related factual findings to the contrary.
. . . . Here, the District Court found [the expert’s] econometric model
capable of measuring damages on a classwide basis, even after striking
three of the injury theories. Contrary to the Court’s characterization, this
was not a legal conclusion about what the model proved; it was a factual
finding about how the model worked. Under our typical practice, we
should leave that finding alone.60
This back-and-forth has thus far received little attention. Yet it is worth
analyzing precisely because the Justices’ dialogue begins to scrape away the
veneer that has allowed the current system of valuation by judge to flourish.
When read to suggest that valuation models themselves are simply legal
opinions, Justice Scalia’s point is problematic for the reasons Justice Gins-
burg offers, however pithily. As we will show, what a valuation model needs
to prove in order to satisfy a legal claim is a question of law; but the opera-
tion of that model and its technical ability to make that showing are ques-
tions of fact. As such, those questions require a fact finder to make a series
of credibility judgments about everything from the expert’s demeanor to her
methodology, her choice of variables, and the way in which she combines
those variables.
Read more moderately, Justice Scalia’s claim is also problematic for rea-
sons we discuss. Most importantly, the decision that a particular valuation
model will indeed offer relevant legal proof involves so many intermediate
factual findings (whether the model is well-designed, includes the right vari-
ables, and is an accepted one in the area, for example) that the preliminary
judgments are inextricable from the ultimate legal conclusion. This means
that credibility judgments about the expert testimony on the variables and
the model itself cannot be separated—at least in the absence of a clear er-
ror—from the ultimate conclusion about whether the model offers a legally
relevant fact.
We suggest here that the majority’s rhetoric, which is inconsistent with
the basic notion that expert-based valuation is no different from any other
form of fact-finding, offers a descriptively accurate account of complex valu-
ation in practice today. That current practice is problematic. And to the
extent the Court’s doctrine reinforces the mindset that complex valuations
60. Id. at 1439–40 (citations omitted).
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are not factual inquiries, it pushes the judicial system further toward a view
of complex valuation as theater and judges into the role of value arbiter
rather than fact finder.61
In the remainder of this Part, we explore the current practices of courts
and litigants in complex valuation cases. While others have described the
problem of expert bias and exposed the degree to which judges routinely
mediate between the extreme values presented by experts, we focus on the
justifications for valuation by a judge. We show how the perception that
valuations are fiction or opinion rather than fact has created an environ-
ment in which judges routinely engage in unprincipled and unpredictable
intervention in the task of valuation. We then explore the social costs im-
posed by this state of affairs.
B. The Current Practice
[S]ince valuation is necessarily an approximation, it is not required that the
value we determine be one as to which there is specific evidence, provided it is
within the range of figures that properly can be deduced from the record.
—Silverman v. Comm’r, 538 F.2d 927, 933 (2d Cir. 1976)
Assigning value is a task the legal system confronts daily. Courts deter-
mine the worth of complex financial assets, entire corporations, and individ-
ual licenses in bankruptcy and tax proceedings. They judge how much lost
or damaged limbs and lost years of work are worth in tort. And they deter-
mine the costs associated with constitutional entitlements, such as an ade-
quate education or the funding necessary to meet the Eighth Amendment
floor for prison conditions.62 Yet despite the frequency with which such cases
are litigated and the gravity inherent in allocating large sums of money in
these contexts, the legal proceedings associated with determining value are
widely conceived of today as “the theater of valuation.”63
Why the theater? As noted above, judges and commentators view com-
plex valuation as its own species of subjective judicial determination, distinct
from situations in which courts determine an objectively verifiable fact, such
as who stole a wallet. This view appears to be founded on a false distinction.
61. The exact import of Justice Scalia’s Comcast language will be revealed only with time.
The language is ambiguous and subject to multiple interpretations. Which interpretation
prevails is beyond the scope of this Article, as it will depend on idiosyncratic judicial behavior.
While the language may be ignored by courts below, or rejected as dicta by the Court itself,
there can be no doubt that lawyers will invoke it when it is to their advantage. If taken whole-
sale, the reasoning may have implications beyond those discussed in this Article. As it is, courts
treat complex valuations as sui generis hybrid problems. They treat them differently from
other facts at the trial level, but the appellate review is still deferential. To follow the Comcast
reasoning to its extreme, the validity, utility, and accuracy of a valuation model may become
pure legal conclusions that are reviewed de novo. It is not certain how the trial court’s assess-
ment of the credibility of the expert witness would fit into that analysis.
62. For examples of the varied cases where courts confront complex valuation, see supra
notes 15–20.
63. See, e.g., 5 Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income,
Estates and Gifts ¶ 135.5.1 (2d ed. 1993).
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In the case of the wallet, the court’s task is viewed as uncovering a fact that
already exists. And no matter how carefully the court approaches its task, it
is theoretically always possible that a subsequent revelation would show the
court’s decision to be incorrect. Valuation of complex assets or entitlements,
by contrast, is not viewed as a quest for that kind of yes or no answer. This
has led to the widespread view that while “the issues are largely if not wholly
factual,” conducting a valuation is “an extraordinarily open-ended pro-
cess.”64 In the words of one bankruptcy court, “valuation is a malleable con-
cept, tough to measure and tougher to pin down without a host of
explanations, sensitivities and qualifiers.”65
Further contributing to the perception that valuing complex assets in-
volves theater is the fact that in such cases courts are invariably presented
with opposing experts who differ about everything from the assumptions
that should be made to the methodology that should be used. And those
choices matter. As one economist has noted, “[a]n inescapable feature of
economic or financial testimony is that even slight changes of a few periph-
eral assumptions lead to substantial differences in valuation estimates.”66 Yet,
rather than focusing attention on the substantive assumptions being made,
the presence of dueling experts in every complex valuation case contributes
to a perception that valuation is simply an exercise in relativism.67 In a re-
cent bankruptcy case, for example, the court described the task of valuation
as “highly dependent on the perspectives and biases of those doing the
measuring.”68
Courts have responded to the perception that complex valuation is a
relative enterprise with an often cynical embrace of their own discretion.69 In
one frequently cited bankruptcy example, a judge handed down a decision
valuing a company at the precise mathematical average of the values pro-
posed by each side, while at the same time pointing out that it “is a total
64. Id. ¶ 135.5.2.
65. In re Charter Commc’ns, 419 B.R. 221, 236 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
66. Yee, supra note 24, at 246.
67. See Robertson, supra note 21, at 178 (“If every serious legal dispute devolves into a
battle of hired-gun experts, the public may come to believe that ‘there is no objectively correct
scientific truth . . . . ’ ” (quoting Bruce D. Sales & Daniel W. Shuman, Experts in Court,
Reconciling Law, Science, and Professional Knowledge 144 (2005))).
68. Charter Commc’ns, 419 B.R. at 236; see also Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d
1137 (Del. 1989), aff’g No. 7959, 1998 WL 15816 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1988) (upholding the
lower court’s evaluation of the experts when one party’s expert valued shares at $44.45 each
while the other party’s expert valued the same shares at $676.80 each); Sieg Co. v. Kelly, 512
N.W.2d 275, 278 (Iowa 1994) (“What we have here is the usual stand off inherent in stock
valuation cases. Both parties believe their expert’s stock valuation calculations are the ‘correct’
ones.”).
69. See, e.g., Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Bruckner, 489 B.R. 93, 102 (E.D. Wis. 2012)
(“[N]either expert’s opinion was entitled to more weight than the other’s.”); Estate of Gal-
lagher v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1702, 1711 (2011) (“Neither expert convinced us as to
the accuracy of his analysis.”).
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absurdity that anybody could fix a value with that degree of precision.”70
Other bankruptcy courts have referred to the “art of valuing a business,”
explaining their decisions to deviate from formulae proposed by the experts
with the observation that such valuations require “the exercise of well-in-
formed judgment.”71
Corporate governance cases are no different. The case law is filled with
cases of courts applying ad hoc methods to value assets, corporations, junk
bonds, and the like.72 Tax courts similarly assert their broad discretion in
complex valuation cases, offering a boilerplate justification for their freedom
to deviate from expert findings in favor of their own judgment.73 In his
treatise on federal taxation, Boris Bittker wrote with understatement that
“[j]udges sometimes relish the role of expert pro hac vice.”74
Current valuation practice resembles a situation in which judges act as
both fact finder and expert in order to justify, ex post, decisions that essen-
tially mediate between the two poles presented by the parties (depicted in
stylized form in Figure 1). Another recent bankruptcy proceeding, for exam-
ple, involved valuing a 252-unit residential real estate development in Ken-
tucky known as Colts Run that was owned by a bankrupt corporation. The
bank and the corporation disputed the development’s value. The bank ar-
gued that the property was worth not less than $17 million, while the debtor
argued that the property was worth $25 million.75
In that case, the bankruptcy judge held a hearing at which she gathered
the attorneys around her laptop in order to walk them through her valuation
decision. She explained that in making her decision, she had “read all of the
appraisals carefully,” looked at “all of [the] assumptions” made by the ex-
perts, and come up with her own value.76 In doing so, the judge consulted
an article describing property valuation techniques and concluded that
70. Citibank, N.A. v. Baer, 651 F.2d 1341, 1347 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting district court
opinion), quoted in, e.g., Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy,
32 UCLA L. Rev. 1061, 1131–32 (1985); Sharfman, supra note 21, at 359.
71. Charter Commc’ns, 419 B.R. at 235.
72. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 7129, 2003 WL 23700218, at *2 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 31. 2003, revised July 9, 2004), modified, 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005) (“Experience in the
adversarial, battle of the experts’ appraisal process under Delaware law teaches one lesson very
clearly: valuation decisions are impossible to make with anything approaching complete confi-
dence . . . .  This effort should, therefore, not be understood, as a matter of intellectual hon-
esty, as resulting in the fair value of a corporation on a given date.”).
73. See, e.g., Buckley v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 754, 759 (1994) (“We are not bound
by the formulae and opinions proffered by an expert, especially when they are contrary to our
judgment. Instead, we may reach a decision based on our own analysis of all the evidence in
the record.”). (citations omitted)
74. 5 Bittker & Lokken, supra note 63, ¶ 135.5.1.
75. Amended Motion for Authority to Use Cash Collateral to Pay Allowed Administra-
tive Claims at *6, In re Colts Run, LLC, No. 10-18071 (Bankr. N.D. Ill., May 19, 2011), 2011
WL 7148613.
76. Transcript of Proceedings at 4–5, In re Colts Run, LLC, No. 10-18071 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. Mar. 8, 2011), ECF No. 249.
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“there really are no accepted principles, there are different approaches.”77
From her reading, the judge apparently felt at liberty to choose her own
values for the various factors that went into the valuation, such as effective
gross income, other income, operating expenses, and cap rate, , and “plug[ ]
them into the [Microsoft Excel] spreadsheets.”78 The opinion does not ex-
plain which formulas the Microsoft Excel spreadsheets contained.
Figure 1
Judicial Approach to Valuation
Expert 1 Judge Expert 2
A, B, C
Model (f)
$200
(A+X)/2, L, Z
?
$400
W, X, Y, Z
Model (g)
$600
Despite acknowledging the maxim that “the income developed by one
[valuation] method [must be] used with a cap rate derived by that same
method,”79 the judge admitted that in doing her own calculation, she “just
could not delve into this and look at whether these definitions were consis-
tent or not.”80 Instead, the judge explained her own valuation methodology.
She gave “half credit” to certain estimates of real estate taxes because, at least
in one instance, she did not know what the part of the property being taxed,
in this case a garage, was like.81 She also “went in the middle” between the
two expert calculations of “effective gross income.”82 She then looked at op-
erating income and again found herself “sort of in the middle between the
bank and the debtor.”83 Finally, with some of the irony that is a common
feature of opinions dealing with complex valuations, the judge told the par-
ties, “amazingly enough, I selected the cap rate [exactly halfway between the
two competing appraisals].”84
77. Id. at 5.
78. Id. at 3–4, 10–11.
79. Id. at 7.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 9–10.
82. Id. at 10.
83. Id. at 10–11.
84. Id. at 11.
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This account is troubling.85 Judges do not routinely acknowledge that
they are ignoring basic mathematical principles and making random as-
sumptions in the absence of information. In fact, when they do so, whether
openly or not, it should be grounds for reversal.86 Our justice system has
mechanisms to deal with limited or absent information.87 Picking a number
out of a hat is not one of them. Yet in this bankruptcy case, the judge was
well within the norm when she decided to do just that. The judge could, and
did, take “heart on the [precedent] . . . that said I could go through there
and pick and choose in terms of different assumptions that were made and
what have you.”88 In the end, after halving her variables without regard to
their correlational integrity, the judge summarized her methodology: she
input the variables and “went down that column and whatever the number
came out to be, the number came out to be.”89 In this case, that number told
her that Colts Run was worth $23,940,914.29.90 Remarkably, if anything is
out of the ordinary about this decision, it is that the judge took the time to
explain her arbitrary reasoning in such detail.
The judgement in the Colts Run case would likely have been upheld
whether or not the judge had explained her reasoning. Reviewing courts
have consistently approved the idea that trial courts have near-total discre-
tion when it comes to complex valuations.91 They have created a regime in
which the lower courts are free to cherry-pick among the assumptions and
methodologies offered by experts, or even to use none at all. For example, in
reviewing a tax court valuation of a gift of closely held stock, the Second
Circuit dismissed an argument by appellants that “the Tax Court’s use of a
method of valuation different from that proposed by either their own or
Commissioner’s experts deprived them of due process of law.”92 In explain-
ing why the tax court was free to adopt its own valuation methodology
rather than that offered by either side’s expert, the Second Circuit reiterated
the surprising conclusion that a value arrived at by the tax court does not
85. For statistics on how common this practice is among bankruptcy judges, see Keith
Sharfman, Judicial Valuation Behavior: Some Evidence from Bankruptcy, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
387, 396–99 (2005).
86. See, e.g., Baba v. Holder, 569 F.3d 79, 83 n.3 (2d Cir. 2009) (reversing immigration
judge’s determination because the judge’s “gratuitous assumption” about a particular country
was “rank unsupported speculation”); Estate of Todisco v. Comm’r, 757 F.2d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir.
1985) (reversing tax court finding because the lower court’s method for calculating gross profit
percentage was “arbitrary and excessive” and based on an unsupported factual assumption).
87. Some elementary ways that the system addresses informational vacuums include bur-
dens of production, discovery requests and conferences, or, if those fail, burdens of proof that
punish the failure to produce information.
88. Transcript of Proceedings at 4–5, In re Colts Run, LLC, No. 10-18071 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. Mar. 8, 2011), ECF No. 249.
89. Id. at 5.
90. Id. at 4.
91. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. But see Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S.
Ct. 1426 (2013).
92. Silverman v. Comm’r, 538 F.2d 927, 933 (2d Cir. 1976).
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need to be “a figure as to which there is specific testimony, if it is within the
range of figures that may properly be deduced from the evidence.”93
What counts as a proper deduction from the record, in turn, is almost
anything that is not obviously contravened by an actual document or, in
rare cases, by precedent establishing that a particular methodology should
be used. The leading tax treatise on valuation states that “decisions of the
trier of fact on [valuations] are so rarely overturned on appeal that they are,
for practical purposes, conclusive.”94
The main rationale for allowing trial courts such latitude is the percep-
tion that valuations are “at best a process of weighing evidence of expert
guesswork.”95 Judicial guesswork has long been accepted in courts as an anti-
dote to advocate experts who slant their results in one direction or another.
As early as 1963, an article in the Tax Law Review described “the impression
among the legal profession, accountants, estate managers, and others that
valuation is essentially a process of ‘horse-trading’ in which each party takes
an extreme position in the hope that the final compromise will be to his
advantage.”96
Courts often express frustration at what many judges conceive of as dis-
ingenuous and “overzealous effort[s]” to “infuse a talismanic precision” into
expert valuations.97 Some have famously accused the parties of playing cha-
rades with their valuation evidence and threatened them with choosing one
side or the other’s valuation in toto unless they agree to settle—a threat
which comes close to the solution proposed here.98 Others, like the judge in
Colts Run, have given up on the experts and conducted their own haphazard
valuations. One bankruptcy judge adjusted the value of a license upward by
25 percent, while explaining, illogically, that “obviously it’s not within [my]
capacity . . . to properly create an independent valuation, but I am im-
pressed that there has to be some adjustment made to the valuation that [the
plaintiff’s expert] suggested.”99
In short, the idea that complex valuation is a fuzzy and most likely im-
possible enterprise has allowed courts to conceive of their role in the process
as simply to mediate between the values presented by the parties in an at-
tempt to resolve the dispute, rather than to achieve a procedurally legitimate,
accurate, and predictable outcome.
93. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Comm’r, 250 F.2d 242, 249 (5th Cir. 1957) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 950 (1958)); see also supra note 39.
94. 5 Bittker & Lokken, supra note 63, ¶ 135.5.2.
95. Id. (quoting Andrews v. Comm’r, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 459 (1976)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
96. Chelcie C. Bosland, Tax Valuation by Compromise, 19 Tax L. Rev. 77, 78 (1963).
97. Buffalo Tool & Die Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 441, 452 (1980) (quoting Messing v.
Comm’r, 48 T.C. 502, 512 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Id. at 451 (“As the Court repeatedly admonished counsel at trial, the issue is more
properly suited for the give and take of the settlement process than adjudication.”).
99. Transcript of Hearing at 7–8, In re Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-10930 (Bankr.
W.D. Wis. Oct. 3, 2006), ECF No. 235.
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As discussed in more detail below, the problem here is not merely that
judges lack “expertise.” A judge is at an informational disadvantage in all
settings. An eyewitness has more information about the details of an acci-
dent, just as an expert has more information about the value of an asset.
And both witnesses have complicated incentives to reveal the true informa-
tion. One might imagine an alternate legal system designed in such a way
that all players are forced to reveal perfect information. Our project is nar-
rower. We examine how best to conduct complex valuation within our cur-
rent adversarial system without starting from scratch.100
C. The Costs
The preceding discussion suggests significant practical and theoretical
problems with courts’ approaches to valuation. But more fundamentally the
approach creates significant costs that could otherwise be avoided. They can
be roughly divided into two categories: (1) legitimacy of the legal system and
(2) uncertainty and the cost of contracting.
1. Legitimacy
Throughout this Article we discuss the “illegitimate” or “unprincipled”
nature of the decisions that result from ad hoc judicial valuations. Those are
loaded words that need to be unpacked. From a market transaction perspec-
tive, a judicial process understood to produce highly variable outcomes may
be wasteful (as discussed below) but not necessarily illegitimate.101 The valu-
ation produced would not come anywhere close to estimating true or actual
value, but if that was priced into the transaction there might be little for the
parties to complain of in the sense of fairness or legitimacy.
But the valuation of complex assets has been wrapped full fold into our
adversarial justice system, creating additional legitimacy concerns. The jus-
tice system’s popularly accepted goal is to attempt to reach an accurate, or
“truthful,” outcome.102 Many believe that the failure or success of this goal
can have a significant impact on the public’s buy-in to our justice system.103
100. To the extent one has little confidence in an asymmetrically informed judge to assess
the credibility of any witness, that counsels for a new system entirely. We are not that skeptical.
101. See David Lewis, The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance, 18 Phil. & Pub.
Aff. 53, 53–59 (1989) (theorizing about variable outcomes in punishments for successful and
unsuccessful criminals).
102. Robertson, supra note 21, at 182 (“It goes without saying that outcome accuracy is an
important concept in litigation. Some suppose that the truth has intrinsic value for the legal
system, just as it does in the sciences. A reasonable degree of accuracy is also arguably neces-
sary to make adjudication morally binding and legitimate. Aside from any such intrinsic value,
however, the legal system’s truth-seeking function clearly has instrumental value. The substan-
tive law exists to serve deterrence, compensation, and sometimes punishment; and the achieve-
ment of these purposes demands accuracy.” (footnotes omitted)).
103. See Tom Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 Crime
& Just. 283 (2003) [hereinafter Tyler, Procedural Justice]. Much has been written on the im-
portance of procedural justice to perceptions of fairness and legitimacy in the system. See, e.g.,
May 2015] A Simple Theory of Complex Valuation 1195
This conviction has deep roots in rule-of-law theories that hold that individ-
uals’ “reactions to legal authorities are based to a striking degree on their
assessments of the fairness of the processes by which legal authorities make
decisions.”104
This legitimacy theory suggests three potential problems with arbitrary
judicial valuations embedded in our larger adversarial system. First, arbi-
trary judicial valuations send mixed signals that decrease public confidence
in legal institutions. The systemic use of experts in complex valuation cases
sends the formal message that experts provide valuable information. At the
rates the experts charge, the public would assume as much. In some cases,
testimony can go on for days using up enormous private and public re-
sources. A judge or jury is then charged with determining the facts based on
the expert’s information. Yet lawyers and scholars complain that the process
is an arbitrary theater—that experts are hired guns and that courts are in-
competent referees.
That state of affairs is not invisible to the public as a whole. And it
contradicts the formal message that experts are indispensable to complex
valuations because those valuations strive for accuracy. All else equal, this
will reduce faith that the system is fair and effective. By many accounts, that
loss of faith will lead to more negative reactions to legal authority and less
buy-in to our system generally. That will, in turn, destabilize and reduce the
value of legal authority and institutions. The extent of this problem, if any, is
an empirical question to which we do not have the answer. But, at a mini-
mum, the proposition that random procedural mechanisms have a negative
effect on buy-in to legal authority is consistent with existing evidence.105
The second systemic problem, and perhaps a greater one from an indi-
vidual actor’s perspective, is that the subjective sense of the valuation’s un-
fairness will reduce confidence in the market economy. By conducting
valuation within the courts, the system sends the message that justice, which
in this context will generally mean accuracy, is also a goal of judicial valua-
tion. If arbitrariness were an intended part of the contract in every transac-
tion, the market would embrace an explicitly arbitrary mechanism for
dispute resolution—that is, a mechanism other than a formal legal process.
Because that has not happened, a party at the outset receives the message
that the process is designed to achieve a nonarbitrary, accurate outcome.
Tom Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (2006) (finding people believe in legitimacy of au-
thority when procedures used are perceived as fair more so than if the outcomes are perceived
as just); Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice
on Spouse Assault, 31 Law & Soc’y Rev. 163, 170 (1997) (“[P]erceptions of procedural fairness
affect perceptions of satisfaction with and legitimacy of legal authorities.”); see also Owen M.
Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 965, 978 (1993) (arguing that participating
in the justice system through representation of interests is the key to legitimacy). But see Louis
Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. Legal Stud. 307,
307 (1994) (arguing that accuracy rather than perceptions of procedural fairness is at the root
of legitimacy in the legal system).
104. See, e.g., Tyler, Procedural Justice, supra note 103, at 284.
105. Id.
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Sophisticated repeat players will know better. In theory, those sophisticated
players can take advantage of their asymmetric knowledge and of unsophis-
ticated counter parties who expect accuracy. More likely though, the public
will become skeptical of all market transactions involving complex valua-
tion. That will stifle valuable economic activity. In essence, the subjective
sense of unfairness in valuations within the legal system will reduce confi-
dence in the market economy just as a view of unfairness elsewhere reduces
the credibility of the justice system generally.
A third legitimacy problem with arbitrary valuation is its effect on indi-
vidual behavior. Much has been written about the way individuals view
rules, norms, and unenforceable contract provisions.106 Parties often adhere
to contracts for nonmonetary behavioral reasons. Their word is worth
something. A contract that has no enforceable penalty may still be followed
simply because the party views following it as the right thing to do.107 As the
remedy for breach becomes completely arbitrary and the parties view that
arbitrariness as endemic to the conflict-resolution system, they may come to
see it as nothing more than an agreement to roll the dice. Knowing that the
other party has the option to use arbitrary valuation to her benefit, one
might be less likely to feel a moral obligation to perform. This reduces the
value of moral obligation in enforcing contracts and makes contracting
more expensive.108
2. Uncertainty and the Cost of Contracting
When courts reach arbitrary results, they create risk and uncertainty109
for any parties who expect that they might one day have to litigate a dispute.
One view might be that this uncertainty has no cost at all. But there are
several reasons why there is likely a cost to this uncertainty. First, in a world
106. See sources cited supra note 103.
107. Transcript of Ruling at 229, In re Ancestry.com, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 7988 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 17, 2012), ECF No. 233 (“I think treating people with dignity and respect assumes
there is a class of buyer out there that actually takes legal obligations seriously, that is not
willing to play Chicago School efficient breach theory games just for fun.”); Douglas G. Baird
& M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1309, 1323 (2008) (“[M]any
directors want to do what they are supposed to do.”); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoff-
man, Breach Is for Suckers, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1003 (2010).
108. Oliver Hart & John Moore, Contracts as Reference Points, 123 Q.J. Econ. 1 (2008); see
also Ernst Fehr & Simon Ga¨chter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 14 J.
Econ. Persp. 159 (2000).
109. Whether uncertainty, risk, or ambiguity is the right term here is subject of great
debate. See Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit 12–14 (1921); see also Daniel
Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. Econ. 643 (1961); Eric L. Talley, On
Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Contractual Conditions, 34 Del. J. Corp. L. 755, 759 (2009)
(“ ‘Risk’ refers to randomness whose probabilistic nature is extremely familiar and can be char-
acterized with objective probabilities (such as the outcome odds that attend the roll of a fair
die). ‘Uncertainty,’ in contrast, refers to randomness whose probabilistic behavior is extremely
unfamiliar, unknown, or even unknowable.”). For our purposes, we will use them inter-
changeably. In this particular context, the analysis is not affected by the distinction.
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in which most people and institutions are risk averse, risky and uncertain
outcomes will push people out of the market.110
Second, uncertainty and risk often can create a lopsided benefit from
litigation. Let’s say that losing a case means that a plaintiff gets nothing, and
winning the case means the plaintiff gets a random payout. A plaintiff with a
valueless case benefits when payouts are more volatile. The payout cannot go
below zero, and so the plaintiff gets all the upside from extreme valuation
and none of the downside. That leads to opportunistic behavior.
This is well-recognized in the bankruptcy context. When a junior credi-
tor pushes for a judicial valuation, it receives all of the upside of a high
valuation and none of the downside.111 For example, if a senior secured
creditor is owed $100, it gets to keep the entire company for all valuations
between zero and $100. But if the court values the company at $200, the
junior creditor gets half. If the court goes to $400, the junior creditor gets 75
percent. The higher the court goes, the more the junior creditor stands to
gain. This means that the more uncertainty or risk inherent in valuations,
the more the junior creditor wins and the senior creditor loses.112 The same
situation will arise any time the judicial valuation has an asymmetric payout
structure.113
This situation can be welfare destroying. By giving one party an incen-
tive to sue, litigation costs are introduced into a transaction. Or, at the very
least, a credible threat of litigation exists. That threat, in turn, provides a
mechanism to extort value—“I won’t sue you if you pay me the cost of
litigation.” The threat of this type of opportunistic behavior renders transac-
tions less likely to occur in the first place.114
With these costs, the deal would be more valuable if both parties could
commit not to exercise their litigation options. Such a commitment costs
neither party in expected value115 and reduces the expected costs for every-
one. But that requires opting out of the default of litigation and designing an
110. Insurance markets may solve this problem in some but not all cases. A risk-averse
party can buy insurance that compensates her when a bad outcome occurs. But asymmetric
information or other transaction costs render insurance a costly solution. See Michael Roths-
child & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Econom-
ics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. Econ. 629, 629 (1976).
111. See Baird & Bernstein, supra note 24, at 1956–57.
112. This is a form of the classic corporate finance “risk-shifting” problem. See Benjamin
C. Esty, A Case Study of Organizational Form and Risk Shifting in the Savings and Loan Indus-
try, 44 J. Fin. Econ. 57 (1997).
113. Delaware appraisal procedures account for this skewed option by imposing lower
valuations on unsuccessful shareholders who seek appraisal in a merger. See, e.g., Gearreald v.
Just Care, Inc., No. 5233, 2012 WL 1569818, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012).
114. This is the classic problem of incomplete contracting and holdup that threatens all
relationship-specific investment. See Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & Econ. 297 (1978); see also Oliver Hart
& John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 Econometrica 755 (1988).
115. Even in the one-sided option case, that asymmetry would have been priced into the
original transaction ex ante.
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alternative valuation mechanism for all disputes, even those that are not op-
portunistic. In some cases, it may not be possible (or cost-effective) to write
such a contract.
For example, in the bankruptcy context it is usually assumed to be al-
most impossible to bind all future creditors to a dispute-resolution mecha-
nism. A debtor may have thousands of potential current and future
creditors. Some will be sophisticated banks; others will be employees or
small vendors; others will be involuntary tort creditors. Bankruptcy law as-
sumes an inability to bring all of these creditors to the bargaining table and
therefore imposes mandatory rules defining the relationships between the
parties.116 The same would not be true of a bilateral deal between two large
businesses. But even with those parties, varying rules on the enforceability of
arbitration and forum selection clauses will come into play.
Relatedly, uncertainty and risk skew the incentives of parties to use liti-
gation as a dispute-resolution mechanism. First, in the examples above, if
there is a choice of mediation, arbitration, self-help, or some other resolu-
tion on the one hand, and litigation on the other, the expected accuracy of
the mechanisms will affect the choice of mechanism. Parties with strong
cases will prefer accurate mechanisms, while parties with weak cases will
prefer inaccurate mechanisms. The choice of dispute-resolution mechanism
becomes distorted based on which party controls the choice and the strength
of its case. To the extent we think there is value in litigation, inaccuracy
detracts from reliance on it and reduces its value. Moreover, the cases that
are pushed toward litigation are pushed there precisely to take advantage of
the inaccuracy of that system.
Second, uncertainty and risk will change the ex ante value of transac-
tions for parties that expect to have stronger cases or expect to have less
control over the dispute-resolution mechanism. A party that knows it is un-
likely to control the choice of forum and dispute-resolution mechanism will
require a higher price, or demand that alternative dispute-resolution provi-
sions be added. A party that expects to adhere to the contract and have a
stronger case will also seek to raise the price or require alternative dispute-
resolution provisions. These attempts to contract around the valuation
problem will affect the cost of the transaction.
II. A New (Old) Theory of Valuation
Doubtless many would attempt to strike some compromise somewhere in the
middle. But a figure thus arrived at would itself be unreal, one never seen
anywhere in the record.
—Colonial Fabrics, Inc. v. Comm’r, 202 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1953)
The costs inherent in our existing valuation regime have not gone un-
recognized in the courts or in the academy. There is a wide-ranging consen-
sus among scholars and judges that the current approach to complex
116. Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 23–24 (Beard
Books 2001) (1986).
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valuations is troubled.117 Evidence scholars have proposed solutions ranging
from employing court-appointed experts118 to using accredited in-
termediaries or blind experts,119 to imposing restrictions that would require
courts to assign values based on a formulaic approach to multiple expert
valuations.120 The solution need not be as complicated as these proposals
suggest.
By unnecessarily overcomplicating the judicial approach to complex val-
uation, courts and academics have introduced frictions that make judicial
fact-finding more artificial and less efficient. The view that valuation is un-
like other fact-finding, that it is art rather than science, has led courts astray
from the central task: finding of facts. By returning to first principles that
are already assumed to govern in this area, we arrive at a straightforward and
effective solution. That solution not only simplifies the judge’s role but also
serves to better align the incentives of litigants. And it harnesses the benefits
of the adversarial system to arrive at more accurate outcomes. Accuracy, in
turn, creates significant social value.
In this Part, we first address the theoretical and practical foundation for
returning valuation to the process of traditional fact-finding. We then dis-
cuss how implementation would play out in practice.
A. Foundation
We have suggested that courts and many commentators accept judicial
averaging in the valuation cases because they lack a principled theory of
complex valuation, and they are unwilling to recognize that the simple theo-
ries we apply to traditional fact-finding apply with equal force in the valua-
tion context. Commentators liken conducting valuations to an art not a
117. See, e.g., In re Charter Commc’ns, 419 B.R. 221, 235 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (describ-
ing the complexity of valuation proceedings in a large corporate bankruptcy and the subjective
nature of valuation); Transcript of Hearing at 4, In re Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc., No. 06-10930
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. Oct. 3, 2006), ECF No. 235 (“Valuation is always an inexact science . . . . ”);
Devitt, supra note 49, at 213 (“[E]xpert witnesses only perpetuate[ ] the enduring concerns of
trustworthiness, partiality, and litigation . . . .  [I]t is time to tinker a little with this process
. . . . ”); Robertson, supra note 21, at 177–79 (“[T]he litigation system has not yet found a way
to provide factfinders with reliable and unbiased expert signals while still leaving the develop-
ment of cases in the hands of the self-interested litigants.”); Sharfman, supra note 85, at
387–90 (arguing that one of the results of the “inherently imprecise” and “discretionary” na-
ture of valuation in bankruptcy is the enactment of a prodebtor bias on the part of bankruptcy
judges); Soled, supra note 51, at 283–84 (“[P]rolonged litigation [is often] marked by ‘Solo-
mon-like’ pronouncements, as judges tend to split warring parties’ valuation differences.”);
Kenton K. Yee, Combining Value Estimates to Increase Accuracy, 60 Fin. Analysts J. 23, 23
(2004) (arguing that a plethora of valuation procedures yielding different valuations creates
problems for courts and businesses in complex valuations).
118. Andrew MacGregor Smith, Note, Using Impartial Experts in Valuations: A Forum-
Specific Approach, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1241 (1994).
119. Robertson, supra note 21.
120. Sharfman, supra note 21, at 361.
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science,121 and courts repeat the caveat that “[w]hen it comes to valuation,
there is no revealed, objectively verifiable truth.”122 This, of course, suggests
that there is a revealed and objectively verifiable truth about other factual
determinations. The car accident happened at exactly 8:00 p.m. That is truth
and science. The company is worth $1 billion. That is art and subjective
opinion.123 That distinction is false and misunderstands the concept of valu-
ation (or perhaps “truth”). If a camera is “known” with certainty not to
have been tampered with and to have a perfectly calibrated time display,
then eyewitness testimony about the time of the accident can be verified. In
the same way, if an asset is being traded on a perfectly liquid market with no
market failures, its value can be verified.124 Yet those cases rarely exist; if they
did, they would undoubtedly result in private settlements or plea bargains.
In the real world, valuation is essentially an exercise in determining
what the relevant community, whether it is composed of financial investors
or art lovers, collectively thinks an asset or claim is worth. The view held by
that community is a fact that can be developed just like any other fact. To be
sure, the true or intrinsic worth (if such a thing exists) may never be deter-
minable. But that is not what valuation is about. The valuation of a com-
pany or asset is a measure of its monetary value to the relevant community.
Art philosophers may debate the intrinsic worth of a Picasso painting, but
the courts and valuation experts are really concerned with the value that a
community of art collectors and critics place on it at a given moment in
time. Similarly, the intrinsic worth of a company is different from its “value”
in the sense that is important to the law.
Another bankruptcy case demonstrates this.125 The court handling the
bankruptcy of Iridium, a satellite phone company, was tasked with deciding
whether Iridium was solvent at the time it made certain transfers.126 The
court had to decide whether Iridium had a positive net worth. In hindsight,
Iridium was a worthless venture to build and sell expensive phones that
121. E.g., Wertheimer, supra note 31, at 629; see also, 5 Bittker & Lokken, supra note 63,
¶ 135.5.1 (noting that experts are often judged and their testimony weighed based on their
demeanor rather than their models).
122. Charter Commc’ns, 419 B.R. at 236; see also Weller v. ABC, 283 Cal. Rptr. 644, 653
(Ct. App. 1991) (“[V]aluation . . . is an inexact science.”); Lawson Mardon Wheaton, Inc. v.
Smith, 734 A.2d 738, 746 (N.J. 1999) (“There is no inflexible test for determining fair value, as
‘[v]aluation is an art rather than a science.’ ” (quoting Wertheimer, supra note 31, at 629)).
123. On the distinction between opinion and fact, see Hand, supra note 22, at 50 n.1
(noting that “[t]he expert is in effect not telling of facts at all” and dismissing as “frivolous”
attempts to question the distinction in most practical cases).
124. In a perfect market with perfect information, no liquidity constraints, and no trans-
action costs the market price will define the asset’s value. See Jay W. Eisenhofer & John L.
Reed, Valuation Litigation, 22 Del. J. Corp. L. 37, 122 (1997) (“If a market for an asset exists,
the value is equal to the market price of the asset . . . . ”).
125. In re Iridium Operating LLC, 373 B.R. 283, 291 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2007) (“[T]he pub-
lic markets constitute a better guide to fair value than the opinions of hired litigation experts
whose valuation work is performed after the fact and from an advocate’s point of view.”).
126. Id. at 290.
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could not be used in buildings, cars, or cities with skyscrapers.127 But the
court found that it was solvent.128 Why? Because at the time of the relevant
transfers, the market thought it could overcome its products’ technological
limitations and become wildly profitable. The court relied heavily on the
fact that the market continued to infuse capital and offer financing to Irid-
ium.129 The value of the business was not its intrinsic worth, but rather the
value that the relevant market placed on its assets given the available infor-
mation at the relevant time of the transfer.130 On any given date, assets are
worth what people will pay for them.
Thus, for valuation, evidence will be gathered and presented from which
the community’s view can be inferred. The relevant evidence, however, is
farther from everyday experience and includes testimony about the existence
and application of best practices that are often known only to those within
the community—just as the events at the corner of Adams and Michigan are
known only to those who were there at the time of the accident.
In determining the value of a complex asset, the appropriate methodol-
ogy to use and the community best situated to determine the asset’s value
will vary (and often be controversial). The same is true, however, of tradi-
tional facts. The factual questions in complex valuation cases require weigh-
ing the merits of the methodologies for valuing the type of asset at issue and
the variables necessary to calculate value using the best methodology. An
expert model is like an eyewitness on the southeast corner of an intersection.
The other model is a witness on the northeast corner. The fact finder hears
evidence about the merits of the model just as she hears evidence about
whether the sun was in the eyes of the eyewitnesses. As Chief Judge Kaye of
the New York Court of Appeals explained in a school finance case, “[w]hen
courts undertake to resolve a controversy that others have brought before
them, they appropriately resort to the tools of the judicial trade—testimony,
evidence and fact-finding.”131 Burdens of proof are another recourse of the
fact finder in both complex valuation cases and those involving more tradi-
tional fact-finding. There is no theoretical difference between traditional
facts and complex valuation; and we suggest there are several practical bene-
fits to treating them the same.
When the eyewitness testifies that she saw the cars collide at 8:00 p.m.,132
the fact finder determines that the collision happened at 8:00 p.m. In exactly
127. See id. at 308–10.
128. Id. at 352 (finding Iridium had a “positive enterprise value”).
129. Id. at 296 (“[There is] strong evidence of a prepetition enterprise that had the ability
to access the capital markets for debt and equity infusions.”).
130. Of course if someone is fraudulently hiding information, that makes the market val-
uation unreliable. But a court will, as the court in Iridium did, undertake a factual inquiry as
to whether such fraud was present. See id. at 346–50.
131. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 63 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
132. One might imagine a hypertechnical judge that would allow the witness to testify
only that her watch said 8:00 p.m. For all she knows, the watch may have been off by a few
minutes or more. That raises questions about the validity and foundation of the information
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the same manner, the expert is not testifying that the company is worth $1
billion. Rather the testimony is that her model suggests that the company is
worth $1 billion. Again, the fact finder determines that it is actually worth
$1 billion. The question we confront is whether a judge or jury can, based
on either of these respective statements with no additional information,
conclude that the accident happened at 9:30 p.m. or the company is worth
$600 million. There is no justification for tolerating the unfounded valua-
tion determination but not the unfounded time determination.
The American legal system is premised on the idea that procedural pro-
tections should, at a minimum, produce principled outcomes.133 To arrive at
those outcomes efficiently and accurately, procedural and evidentiary rules
require that judges hear testimony, look at documents and other physical
evidence properly in the record, weigh credibility, and make findings of fact
to which they apply the relevant law. Under the Rules of Evidence, parties
can introduce qualified experts to assist the fact finder in cases where exper-
tise is essential to understanding the controversy.134 In the ultimate analysis,
courts may not stray beyond the parameters of what is supported by the
record.135 If they do, their decisions should be reversed and/or remanded on
appeal.136 In addition, if a party bears the burden of proof and fails to intro-
duce enough evidence to meet that burden, that party should not prevail.137
Theoretically, there is no reason those basic safeguards should not apply
in complex valuation cases. They guarantee, at a minimum, that the courts
conduct valuations in a principled manner and that the ultimate valuation is
clearly based on evidence in the record. Yet courts approaching complex
valuation as an art rather than a science misperceive the nature of the evi-
dence in complex valuation cases. If courts are seeking the “true” value of a
company or, in other words, the best possible valuation for a company or
asset that can be provided at a particular moment in time, then a complex
provided for by the watch. Most likely the testimony will be allowed and any questions about
the foundation of the witness statement of time and the accuracy of her watch will be left for
cross-examination.
133. William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 Cardozo L.
Rev. 1865, 1894 (2002) (“A host of procedural design choices and procedural rules, more or
less implicitly, attempt to protect against outcome disparities.”).
134. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
135. 21B Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and
Procedure § 5102.1 (2d ed. 2005) (“[C]ases must be decided solely on the basis of evidence
produced in open court and subject to all of the procedural protections that make up the
adversary system. This principle [is] known technically as ‘the principle of the exclusivity of
the record’ . . . . ” (footnote omitted) (quoting Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Right of Confron-
tation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 Crim. L. Bull. 99, 103
(1972))).
136. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 473 (1918) (“But the question
arises, whether the basis of fact on which the state court rested in its decision . . . has any
support in the record; for if not, it is our duty to review and correct the error.”).
137. Kohler Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 1032, 1036–37 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that
when both parties put forward manifestly erroneous valuations, the IRS lost because it had the
burden of production).
May 2015] A Simple Theory of Complex Valuation 1203
valuation cannot be produced without a coherent understanding of which
variables are relevant and how to combine those variables to reach a value.
That understanding usually appears in the form of a mathematical
model introduced by an expert. Courts lack the expertise to produce such
models. Entire textbooks exist to explain valuation techniques to financial
analysts with degrees in accounting, finance, or economics.138 Decisions
about which models to apply also require expertise. Financial analysts typi-
cally apply multiple techniques in any given valuation and may “run
through more than one methodology when asked to value a company.”139
This does not mean that the judge has no role. Instead, the judge must
exclude unqualified experts, evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and the
soundness of the facts or assumptions on which they base their valuations,
and apply the burden(s) of proof. The judge must insist that an expert per-
suade the court that her methodology is superior and must be meticulous in
questioning the variables in an expert’s model. The judge may even make
intermediate findings of fact that may alter the final valuation. For example,
if the judge is persuaded that a particular variable, such as depreciation, has
been inflated or deflated by one or both experts, the judge may adopt a
different number so long as it is supported by the record. The judge also has
the option to determine that a burden of proof simply has not been met and
direct an outcome accordingly.
Yet when it comes to deriving meaning from a set of factual variables,
the judge is not free to create a new valuation model. The judge must instead
rely on a model that appears in the record. Changing a valuation model is
akin to changing a fact. Such models are internally coherent wholes created
by experts. While different approaches may apply to a particular valuation,
and it is a matter of expert opinion which approach is best and how to
design the model, each approach requires its own formula in the record
from which a valuation is derived from a set of variables.
To give an analogy, a case in which two valuation models are introduced
is like a case in which two witnesses testify. One witness says that the rob-
bery happened on Seventh Avenue in Manhattan, and the other witness says
it happened on Fifth Avenue. In such a case, the judge should, and almost
certainly will, be reversed if she decides that the robbery happened on Sixth
Avenue. That is an incoherent and illogical response to the two witnesses’
competing accounts. Instead, the judge has to make a credibility determina-
tion to decide whether the robbery happened on Fifth Avenue or Seventh
Avenue—or perhaps neither, if both witnesses lack credibility.
Similarly, valuation models constitute evidence of the take-it-or-leave-it
variety.140 Either the judge believes a particular model will offer the most
accurate value or she doesn’t. Complex valuation models generally do not
consist of easily interchangeable parts but instead rely on a fine degree of
138. See, e.g., Aswath Damodaran, Investment Valuation (3d ed. 2012); David Isaac
& John O’Leary, Property Valuation Techniques (3d ed. 2013).
139. Yee, supra note 117, at 23.
140. Sharfman, supra note 21, at 370.
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coherence in the way that their input variables are calculated.141 A judge may
make fact-findings about which variables are appropriate or what values cer-
tain variables will have, but this will have implications for the model. An
expert might be able to create a different model from pieces of two other
models, but that would create an entirely new piece of evidence and offer a
new valuation. For a judge to find a value not derived from an expert’s
model would be for her to step into the role of expert and conduct a new
valuation using a formula never before seen in the record. This is both be-
yond her competence and outside the scope of the judge’s prerogative as fact
finder—not fact generator.
Furthermore, if a judge credits none of the offered valuation models
(and the parties have the ability to make cases against models through their
own experts or through cross-examination) then the party with the burden
has likely failed to make her case. Judge Posner pointed this out in Kohler Co.
v. United States, “How to choose between adversaries’ valuations when both
are manifestly erroneous? The conventional response would be that the
party with the burden of proof (in the sense of the burden of persuasion)
would lose.”142 As the Supreme Court wrote in Daubert, “[v]igorous cross-
examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on
the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking
shaky but admissible evidence.”143
Part of the confusion that arises in complex valuation cases comes from
the complicated role of experts in litigation. Under Federal Rule of Evidence
702, expert testimony is admissible “if and because it will assist the trier of
fact to understand evidence that will determine a fact in issue.”144 The cur-
rent rule makes clear that a qualified expert may testify “in the form of an
opinion,”145 in order to “suggest[ ] the inference which should be drawn
from applying the [expert’s] specialized knowledge to the facts.”146 Courts
routinely cite to Rule 702 as they mislabel any information introduced by
experts as mere “opinion.”147 That label is one justification courts offer for
disregarding the testimony “of any expert witness when that opinion is con-
trary to [the court’s] judgment.”148
141. For example, several methods exist for calculating net operating income for the pur-
pose of valuing real estate. One article describing these methods advises appraisers that they
“can ensure that appraisal values are meaningful by,” among other things, “be[ing] certain
that the [capitalization] rate employed to capitalize a given NOI [net operating income] was
derived in a method consistent with the development of that NOI.” John M. Francis, The
Elusive Definitions of NOI and OAR, 66 Appraisal J. 56, 60 (1998).
142. Kohler, 468 F.3d at 1035.
143. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
144. Parker v. Comm’r, 86 T.C. 547, 561 (1986) (summarizing precedent on the applica-
tion of Federal Rule of Evidence 702).
145. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
146. Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note.
147. See, e.g., Parker, 86 T.C. at 561.
148. Id.
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Yet, in complex valuation cases, expert witnesses do more than offer
their opinions about facts. They also introduce necessary evidence in the
form of valuation models and the data that goes into them.149 An expert’s
testimony that the model is the right one to use in a particular scenario and
the expert’s assertion about the ultimate inference that can be drawn from
the model must be assessed for credibility and coherence by judges in com-
plex valuation cases. The model itself, however, is not an opinion that the
court can adjust. For a judge to justify doing her own haphazard math by
declaring that the expert’s model is an “opinion” subject to the court’s judg-
ment is the same as a judge deciding that the robbery happened on Sixth
Avenue when the witnesses say Fifth and Seventh; it is changing a fact to a
wholly new fact rather than drawing a supportable inference from a given
set of information.
While courts repeatedly note their imperative to issue judgments based
only on the facts in the record, the semantics of Rule 702 aid them in erro-
neously excluding from that category the mathematical models used to
transform raw data into valuations purely because those models are created
by experts. Once they have labeled the models and other information intro-
duced by experts’ “opinion,” courts assert that they are free to “be selective
in the use of any portion of such an opinion.”150
This leads to a particularly troubling outcome in complex valuation
cases. If the methodology used to value an asset is exclusively a matter of
opinion, then courts are free to introduce their own opinions about how to
value the asset. This means that, as in the bankruptcy case described in Part
I, they can average or otherwise combine numbers that appear in the record
in any way they see fit.151 By extension, reviewing courts find that the “facts”
in the record support judge-made valuations because without the constraint
of a particular methodology or model, the “facts” in the record can be com-
bined in manifold ways to support any valuation.152 Thus, as outlined in Part
149. Typically, the data and facts in a complex valuation case are admissible into evidence.
Rule 703 provides, with certain caveats, that an expert may disclose facts or data he or she uses
in forming her conclusions even “if the facts or data [an expert relies on] would otherwise be
inadmissible.” Fed. R. Evid. 703. The emphasis on distinguishing between fact testimony and
opinion testimony is today something of a historical anachronism. Compare, e.g., Charles T.
McCormick, Some Observations upon the Opinion Rule and Expert Testimony, 23 Tex. L. Rev.
109, 110–11 (1945), with Fed. R. Evid. 701. Rule 701 now provides that lay witnesses may also
testify “in the form of an opinion” if that opinion is “rationally based on the witness’s percep-
tion,” nontechnical, and helpful to understanding the testimony or to determining a fact in
issue. Fed. R. Evid. 701.
150. Buckley v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 754, 759 (1994).
151. See supra Part I.
152. Silverman v. Comm’r, 538 F.2d 927, 933 (2d Cir. 1976).
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I, courts routinely combine their own conclusions about intermediate vari-
ables in a valuation calculation—the so-called “facts”—in virtually uniden-
tifiable ways to produce a final valuation.153 A reviewing court then upholds
that valuation, holding that it is supported by “facts” in the record.154
B. Implementation
If, as we have argued, the goal in complex valuations is for the judge’s
conclusion to correspond to the valuation that the relevant community be-
lieves to be accurate, then the basic tenets of American civil procedure and
evidence require a shift in the way such valuations are conducted. Judges are
not free to assign their own values based on dubious manipulations of
Microsoft Excel spreadsheets or simple averaging. Valuations must instead
be generated by the techniques used in the relevant community.
In most cases, those techniques will be embodied in a valuation model.
The fact-finding role requires judges to actively scrutinize the models offered
by experts. Experts are typically the only people in the case with the experi-
ence and the often-specialized education required to perform appraisals, in-
terpret financial statements, find and interpret the kind of market data that
goes into a valuation, and create a valuation model that will derive meaning
from all of the variables. Once the experts have testified, courts must and
typically do scrutinize the individual judgments made by experts with a
combination of deference to their expertise and skepticism born of the con-
viction that many “subjective judgments [are] made in arriving at . . . opin-
ions of value.”155 Conscientious courts must continue to look to “the reasons
underlying an expert’s subjective judgments” in order to assess each facet of
a valuation.156
In other words, what judges are required and competent to do, in addi-
tion to excluding unqualified experts, is to question the assumptions that the
experts make, to insist that experts persuade them that theirs is the best
methodology, to be meticulous in questioning the pieces that make up that
methodology, and to enforce the burden of proof. The judge should evaluate
an expert’s credibility and her methodology (based on direct and cross-ex-
amination or even the judge’s own examination) rather than intervene and
adopt the role of the expert herself.
The distinction between these two roles can be seen in In re Chemtura
Corp.157 There the judge went through a lengthy and thorough credibility
inquiry only to conclude that the experts’ lack of credibility counseled him
“to be more proactive in making my own valuation judgment, rather than to
153. See supra Part I.
154. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
155. Buckley, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) at 760 (“[W]e do not find the opinions of value offered by
respondent’s expert to be entirely persuasive.”).
156. Id.
157. 439 B.R. 561 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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accept either of the proffered ones.”158 The first half of that analysis (on
credibility) is the proper role of the judge; the second half (proactively mak-
ing an independent valuation) is not.
Thus, a judge may accept or reject the number produced by the chosen
methodology.159 By definition, however, only an expert can apply a given
methodology in a complex valuation case with the rigor necessary to pro-
duce meaning from a set of inputs and a formula.160
When a judge presides over a complex valuation, therefore, she generally
should be bound to choose a number generated by a model introduced by
one of the parties. This may mean that the judge must choose the valuation
offered by one side or another. It may also mean that a judge rejects all
valuations and applies procedural rules, like the burden of proof, to deter-
mine the outcome of the valuation proceeding.161
Figure 2
Proposed Static Approach to Judicial Valuation
Expert 1 Judge Expert 2
A, B, C
Model (f)
$200 $200 or $600
W, X, Y, Z
Model (g)
$600
Figure 2 assumes that all input variables (A, B, C and W, X, Y, Z) are
endogenous to and inextricably linked to the respective model. For many
variables this will be the case. For others it won’t. In a dynamic context,
depicted in Figure 3, it may be that the judge, after carefully scrutinizing the
expert testimony, finds a certain model to be credible, makes factual findings
related to variables that go into that model, and orders the expert who pro-
duced the chosen model to use the variables and the model to generate a
final valuation.162
Note that the link between variables and the model is itself a factual
question. Some models will by design require certain input variables to be
158. Chemtura Corp., 439 B.R. at 590.
159. Although our motivation is different, our proposal is similar to final-offer arbitra-
tion. That literature provides insight into the incentive effects of requiring that a judge or
arbitrator take or leave a party’s proposed valuation. See supra Section II.A. The main practical
difference comes from the nuances introduced by the burden of proof. Additionally, the judge
should be more focused on the credibility of the proposed methodology rather than simply the
reasonableness of the number (which under our analysis can be determined only by looking at
the methodology).
160. See Hand, supra note 22, at 54 (noting that the expertise is “confessedly foreign” to
the fact finder’s experience).
161. See Kohler Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 1032, 1035 (7th Cir. 2006).
162. See supra Section II.B.
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correlated with each other or with assumptions in the model. Other vari-
ables will have a value that does not depend on the model or its assump-
tions. For the former, the inputs will live and die with the model. For the
latter, the judge may make separate factual findings on which inputs to use
(as long as the record supports those findings).163
Thus, in Figure 3, the judge determines that Model (f) is the best valua-
tion methodology and then makes factual findings about the value of the
variables that go into the model. The variables must be consistent with the
model, hence they are related to Expert 1’s variables (A, B, C). At the same
time, they won’t necessarily mirror the inputs suggested by the expert.
This may require expert testimony on various things: (1) the proper
model, (2) which variables have a value that does not depend on the model,
and (3) where input variables are not dependent on the model, which values
to use. Experts may disagree on one or all of these points. The key remains
that the judge’s ruling must be supported by evidence in the record. If the
plaintiff’s expert testifies that her model is the correct one and can provide a
proper result only with input variable X, the defendant has two options: (1)
put on an expert suggesting a different model or (2) put on an expert testify-
ing that the plaintiff’s model is more accurate if variable X is replaced with
variable A. Of course, the defendant may try to make these arguments in the
alternative as well.
Figure 3
Proposed Dynamic Approach to Judicial Valuation
Expert 1 Judge Expert 2
A, B, C
Model (f)
$200
A’, B’’, C
$200 or $500 or $600
X, Y, Z, B’, C”
Model (g)
$600
In this dynamic context, the new system depicted in Figure 3 has the
judge making fact-findings both on the input variables (A’, B’’, and C), and
on the appropriate model to determine the final valuation (Model (f)). In
addition to ensuring that valuations are based on facts properly in the re-
cord, this system would preempt the kind of mathematical incoherence that
was so pronounced in the valuation of the Colts Run housing develop-
ment.164 Rather than ignoring the requirement that “the income developed
by one [valuation] method [be] used with a cap rate derived by that same
163. See 21B Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., supra note 135,
§ 5102.1.
164. For a discussion of the judge’s mathematical determination, see supra Section I.B.
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method,”165 the judge would be required to consider the methods for assess-
ing income and cap rates and choose one. The judge would also need to
choose from the models offered if the experts offered different valuation
methods. The judge’s fact-finding would contribute to the ultimate valua-
tion, which would be conducted by the expert—or experts if both valuation
models were the same and only the variables differed.
The evaluative process may result in the lay judge being dissatisfied with
pieces of each expert’s presentation. The response in such a case, we argue,
should be for the judge to highlight the areas in which the experts lack credi-
bility and to require that the parties bring in a new expert or improve the
expert’s presentation to address those concerns.166 Rather than inserting the
tax calculation from one model into a model that relies on incompatible
assumptions about depreciation, for example, the judge should require that
the parties put the evidence in the record and make the necessary adjust-
ments. Judges, as fact finders, are not tasked with adjusting complicated for-
mulae that rely on interdependent assumptions. If a party cannot produce a
credible expert or sufficient evidence to persuade the judge, the result
should not be for the judge to do the party’s work. If the judge starts creat-
ing the factual evidence based on intuition, some form of averaging, or ad
hoc adjusting, the judge undermines the fundamental importance of the fac-
tual record. Instead, as in any case in which a party with the burden of proof
provides insufficient evidence, a party that brings in an exaggerated valua-
tion that lacks credibility should not prevail even if the other party is equally
lacking in credibility.167
Returning complex valuation to the traditional fact-finding process will
reduce the costs of uncertainty discussed above. Uncertainty is reduced, first,
because the court is expected to adopt the most reasonable model proposed
by the parties. This limitation narrows the range of possible numbers that
the court can adopt. By grounding the value in a reasonable model, market
165. Transcript of Hearing at 7, In re Colts Run, LLC, No. 10-18071 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar.
8, 2011), ECF No. 249.
166. Other structural changes to the presentation of evidence would enhance judges’ abil-
ity to focus in on crucial areas of disagreement between experts. One excellent proposal in the
tax context calls for a “concurrent evidence” approach in which tax court judges would hear
testimony from and question simultaneously sworn experts rather than allowing the experts to
be called sequentially and to testify under the direction of the attorneys in the case. Devitt,
supra note 49. This method has already seen limited use in the tax court and has been adopted
in other common-law systems. See id. at 218 (discussing Rovakat, LLC v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.M.
(CCH) 264 (2011), aff’d, 529 F. App’x 124 (3d Cir. 2013)).
167. Posner applied this standard in Kohler Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 1032, 1035–37
(2006), holding that where both parties put forward manifestly erroneous valuations, the IRS
lost because it had the burden of production. As Posner noted, the exact location of the bur-
dens of production and persuasion can be complicated in tax cases. See id. But once those
burdens are established, applying them to valuation is straightforward. Id. at 1037. As we have
suggested throughout, many courts go in the other direction, embracing valuation-as-an-art
theories to justify ignoring burdens of proof. See, e.g., Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. AEP
Power Mktg., Inc., 487 F.3d 89, 108–12 (2d Cir. 2007) (vacating the district court’s denial of
damages due in part to unpersuasive valuation experts and noting that the district court may
assume certain variables in order to arrive at its own reasonable estimate).
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participants can predict a more narrow range of outcomes. Courts may err
in their determination of reasonable models, but we suggest that those er-
rors will be smaller than the errors inherent in judicial valuation. A return to
first principles of fact-finding will also reduce costs in a manner that facili-
tates accuracy and reasonableness. In the current system, the court is
presented with extreme valuation models. In the system promoted here, the
judge will face less extreme models from which to choose. The point is sim-
ple and has long been recognized in the context of final-offer or baseball
arbitration.168
Knowing that the judge will choose the most reasonable approach, both
parties have an incentive to be more reasonable than the other side. Experts,
in turn, will have every incentive to present the most effective, current, and
defensible valuation scheme available. Especially when the burden of proof
clearly rests on a party, that party will go to great lengths to persuade the
fact finder that its model is complete and efficacious. The other party can
either attack that model or present evidence that other models are more
likely to achieve the correct value. The party without the burden of proof
might even take the approach of presenting several models in the alternative,
giving the court a broader view of the spectrum of what might be credible. If
a judge is troubled by a part of the model in the course of litigation, parties
will also be incentivized to make the necessary adjustments to their models
or risk an adverse judgment. Finally, judges themselves will focus on interro-
gating the methodology of the experts instead of relying on their own ex
post adjustments to determine how the relevant community values a partic-
ular asset.169 These changes will cause the range of models to narrow and
will provide more predictability, which will also reduce the fact finder’s cost
in assessing the models. A changed focus on fact-finding principles also pro-
vides an incentive to the expert witnesses to market themselves on their abil-
ity to defend their models as reasonable rather than their willingness to take
extreme positions.
168. See Farmer & Pecorino, supra note 45, at 416; Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A
Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 1135, 1144 (2013). The idea that complex valuation should look more like final-
offer arbitration is not a novel one. See, e.g., Soled, supra note 51, at 284 (suggesting that
Congress adopt final-offer arbitration requiring the judge to choose either the taxpayer or the
IRS’s valuation in tax cases).
169. If a judge lacks the time or ability to comb through the valuation itself, the court may
appoint a special master to carefully review the expert methodology and inputs before coming
to a conclusion. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 971 A.2d 989, 992 (N.J. 2009). The New Jersey
Supreme Court’s approach to recent school-funding litigation provides a good example of how
this works in practice. When the state requested that the court approve its new, complex
funding scheme as constitutional, the court appointed a lower court judge to sit as a special
master. Id. at 992, 1010. The judge heard testimony from the state’s experts as well as from the
other party to the litigation over the course of several months before writing a lengthy opinion
describing the state’s costing-out study and the resulting funding scheme and recommending
that the court find it constitutional. Id.
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III. Implementation in Various Areas
Valuation disputes are at the heart of many fields of litigation today. Yet
the variability and legitimacy problems that plague them have caused schol-
ars and courts to advocate shutting the courtroom doors to valuation dis-
putes. For example, in corporate bankruptcy, the arbitrary way in which
courts declare the value of an asset or claim has led to a near consensus that
the courts’ role in the process should be diminished. Indeed, article after
article has proposed procedural and incentive mechanisms to avoid judicial
valuation altogether.170 And lawyers have drawn on these proposals to come
up with novel auction mechanisms to force parties to value assets without
the intervention of the court.171
Courts have bought into the idea that they should strive to avoid involv-
ing dueling experts in their valuations. Judges at all levels have raised valua-
tions produced by some form of “market” (no matter how flawed) to a
hallowed status.172 When markets appear to be available, however remotely,
the courts will use them at virtually any cost to avoid asking a judge to value
the assets based on expert testimony. In the so-called Vlasic Pickle bank-
ruptcy, for example, the Third Circuit announced that “[a]bsent some rea-
son to distrust it, the market price is ‘a more reliable measure of the stock’s
value than the subjective estimates of one or two expert witnesses.’ ”173 There
were specific reasons to distrust the market in the Vlasic case, and of course
markets may not always measure value as reliably as courts would like.174
We do not suggest that markets are inherently flawed. But market prices
have their limitations. Markets are only as good as the information available.
In the Vlasic case, the creditors alleged that the market had been misled by a
failure of disclosure.175 Thus, in a case where the insiders have the same
information as the market, the market is an ideal valuation tool. But courts
170. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayres, A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing Corporations
in Bankruptcy, 111 Yale L.J. 83, 90–96, 133–34 (2001); Barry E. Adler, Game-Theoretic Bank-
ruptcy Valuation, 41 J. Legal Stud. 209, 218–19 (2012); Casey, supra note 44, at 801–09;
Kerry O’Rourke, Survey, Valuation Uncertainty in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 2005 Colum.
Bus. L. Rev. 403, 447–50; Alan Schwartz, A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy, 91 Va.
L. Rev. 1199, 1205–07 (2005).
171. See, e.g., Central European Distribution Corporation’s Chapter 11 Plan Incorporates
Dutch Auction (Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, New York, N.Y.), Aug. 5, 2013,
available at http://www.skadden.com/newsletters/Novel_Chapter_11_Plan_Incorporates_
Dutch_Auction.pdf.
172. See, e.g., In re Iridium Operating LLC, 373 B.R. 283, 291 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2007);
Skripak v. Comm’r, 84 T.C. 285, 310 (1985); Cupler v. Comm’r, 64 T.C. 946, 954–56 (1975).
173. VFB LLC v. Campbell Soup Co., 482 F.3d 624, 633 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting In re
Prince, 85 F.3d 314, 320 (7th Cir. 1996)).
174. Id. (discounting creditor argument that the public equity market was an improper
reflection of value due to failures of disclosure by Campbell Soup); see also, e.g., Douglas G.
Baird, The Bankruptcy Exchange, 4 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 23, 27 (2009) (“If the judge
follows the market price at the same time those who trade in the market are following the
judge, they will simply be chasing each other’s tails.”).
175. VFB LLC, 482 F.3d at 632–33.
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are often called on to provide an after-the-fact valuation of an asset when
the market was misinformed. In a securities fraud case, the court might be
asked to determine what the value would have been, had the market been
informed. In other cases, such as those involving the trading of bankruptcy
claims, the market may base its value on an expectation of what the court
will do.
Expert testimony is most important when the relevant markets are lim-
ited in this way. Experts can provide a model to show the value that a fully
informed market would place on an asset. In some sense, the well-informed
market is the relevant community. But the cases where complex valuations
are most important are the ones in which a well-informed community does
not exist.
Still, the Supreme Court has placed disproportional weight on the im-
portance of finding a market from which to take a value. The most obvious
example is the seminal case 203 North LaSalle.176 The Court faced the ques-
tion whether junior stakeholders had made a new contribution to the firm
that was valuable enough to justify the share they were receiving in the reor-
ganized business. The Court suggested that value of the contribution could
not be determined by a bankruptcy judge relying on expert testimony.
Rather, the contribution could be considered only if it was market tested.177
The state of corporate governance law in Delaware is similar.178 Courts are
increasingly deferential to markets and market-based decisions, which allows
them to avoid any role in valuation.
Thus, fear of judicial valuation has led courts and scholars to advocate
keeping judges out of complex valuations entirely. Our analysis suggests that
the solution to valuation problems need not be so drastic. Attempts to cor-
rect fundamental errors in the mechanism of judicial valuation should pre-
cede calls for reform that would shunt litigants into private channels in
order to resolve their disputes. If judicial valuation improved considerably, it
would become a viable dispute-resolution mechanism and reduce the dis-
trust that pervades bankruptcy and corporate law. In the bankruptcy con-
text, the impact of this change would be enormous. It would reduce the
severity of the central problem of bankruptcy law today.
In other areas of law, particularly areas where no market exists to pro-
vide an escape hatch in valuation, courts have been more flexible. For exam-
ple, in Abbott v. Burke, a long-running suit alleging, among other things,
that New Jersey’s educational funding system did not meet a constitutionally
176. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434
(1999).
177. Id. at 457 & n.27.
178. See William T. Allen et al., Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business
Organization 323–25 (3d ed. 2009); see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 7129, 2003
WL 23700218, at *2 n.5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003, revised July 9, 2004), modified, Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005) (“Professors Allen and Kraakman have also noted
the institutional disinclination of Chancery judges to engage in the valuation process in certain
circumstances precisely because those judges recognize it as a ‘daunting task’ subject to signifi-
cant uncertainty.”).
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mandated floor for providing an education to the state’s children, the New
Jersey Supreme Court has repeatedly considered competing expert testi-
mony about the amount of money necessary to meet the constitutional min-
imum.179 In a recent iteration of that case, the court again did what it had
done in the past: it appointed a special master to hear testimony from the
experts and make detailed findings and recommendations to the court.180
The special master, a New Jersey trial judge, spent a full month hearing from
both plaintiffs’ experts and experts the state had hired to perform a “cost-
ing-out study.”181 The study sought to quantify the cost of providing an
adequate education by interviewing teachers and education experts about
the inputs necessary for such an education and creating a formula to deter-
mine the amount of money needed to fund those inputs given the number
of low-income and special-needs children in a district, among other
things.182 The special master’s hearings resulted in a detailed report recom-
mending that the court find the state’s funding scheme constitutional.183
Upon conducting its own review of the evidence in the case and the special
master’s report, the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed, issuing a long opin-
ion detailing its findings.184 This process, although lengthy, represents a tri-
umph of sorts for judicial valuation. A court with a reputation for
scrutinizing the evidence in school-finance cases was presented with reputa-
ble experts on both sides, conducted a thorough inquiry into the valuation
technique and the variables used, and made a finding based entirely on evi-
dence in the record.
Of course, many factors make cases about the value of entitlements dif-
ferent from those seeking to value assets.185 Yet this Article suggests a funda-
mental similarity, which is that in both instances, courts must hear
testimony from competing experts about the value of something that it
would be impossible for a lay person, acting alone, to value. In both in-
stances, it is clear what value is sought; in both cases, a court is tasked with
using the full power of the law to arrive at a conclusion based soundly on the
evidence in the record.
Courts like the New Jersey Supreme Court have been tempted to inter-
vene to mediate between the sides in entitlement valuation cases in ways
reminiscent of asset valuation cases. In earlier rulings in the Abbott v. Burke
179. Abbott v. Burke, 971 A.2d 989, 991–93 (N.J. 2009).
180. Id. at 996.
181. Id. at 1000.
182. See id.
183. Id. at 992.
184. See id.
185. Among other things, concerns having to do with separation of powers, the priority
and importance of constitutional-rights enforcement and political pressures unique to entitle-
ments debates all distinguish those cases from the average tax or bankruptcy valuation. See,
e.g., Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role of Courts in Adequacy
Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education, 6 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 83, 108
(2010) (describing separation of powers concerns making courts reluctant to find for plaintiffs
in education-finance cases emphasizing costing-out studies).
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litigation, for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court itself, faced with state
inaction and what it characterized as untenable demands from plaintiffs,
devised its own novel solution to the school-finance problem.186 Even as it
did so, the court called on the state to provide “needed comprehensive re-
lief,” tacitly acknowledging that its own attempt at a remedy would likely fall
short.187 In other education-finance cases, state courts have ignored the find-
ings of their own special masters and bowed to pressure to minimize the
impact on state budgets that these education-finance cases can impose.188
Both responses are politically expedient and potentially justifiable given the
unique contours of constitutional entitlement cases. Yet when viewed as val-
uation cases, it becomes apparent that both are as fundamentally opposed to
the requirement that judgments be based on evidence properly in the record
as the decision by the bankruptcy judge who pulls a number out of a hat in
order to rationalize two wildly inflated expert valuations.
IV. Limitations on Applying the Simple Theory
There are, however, limitations to the panacea of returning to first prin-
ciples in dealing with the legal system’s problems with experts. An approach
that takes the burden of proof seriously and respects mathematical models
will improve most interactions with experts, but it cannot solve many of the
well-documented problems with scientific expert testimony in areas from
toxic torts to medical malpractice to forensics.189 We have argued that the
valuation problem will be ameliorated by a return to the application of
traditional theories of evidence, because the prevailing view that valuation is
art rather than science and the status quo of judicial intervention have re-
leased valuations from all connection to reality. By contrast, the primary
problem with scientific evidence as scholars in the field have articulated it is
not that judges have thrown up their hands and begun doing their own
186. Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 445 (N.J. 1997) (“Presented with no alternative rem-
edy by either the plaintiffs or the State . . . the Court must resort to judicial relief.”).
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2006); see also
Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 185, at 108 (discussing decision of New York’s highest court
to ignore the findings of the lower court and a referee panel and rubber stamp the State’s
funding scheme).
189. Several scholars have noted problems with experts in these areas. See, e.g., Gross,
supra note 21 (describing problems with expert credibility and judicial response in general);
Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Courts, the NAS, and the Future of Forensic Science, 75 Brook. L.
Rev. 1209 (2010) [hereinafter Mnookin, Future of Forensic Science] (describing scientific flaws
in fingerprinting evidence identified in National Academy of Sciences report and judicial re-
sponse); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73
Brook. L. Rev. 1009, 1022–23 (2008) [hereinafter Mnookin, Expert Evidence] (discussing dif-
ficulty in assessing expert evidence in toxic tort cases given a scarcity of established science on
question of causation); Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and
the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 721, 773 (2007) (describing
difficulties with expert evidence in so-called “second generation” forensics cases, such as those
involving DNA).
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science experiments.190 Instead, to oversimplify, it has to do with the quality
of the data being introduced into evidence and the ability of the fact finders,
and often also of the attorneys involved, to understand the science well
enough to discredit tenuous claims.191 There is no rampant inattention to
expert presentations in the birth defect case in which a judge makes a bla-
tantly unscientific finding,192 or in the fingerprint case in which the jury
credits testimony from a fingerprint examiner who represents a tenuous fin-
gerprint match as scientific certainty.193 Instead, those problems involve the
interplay of bad lawyering, corrupt or inept experts, and fact finders who
lack the tools—either through disinterest or lack of specialized knowledge—
to probe behind a veneer of credibility.194
Thus, while problems exist in many other areas involving experts, the
phenomenon of widespread judicial disregard for experts in favor of judicial
pseudoscience is especially pervasive in valuations. Our proposal seeks to
return legitimacy and accuracy to this area by reimposing basic procedural
safeguards that have broken down in valuation cases but not in other areas
that frequently involve dueling experts. This begs the question whether mak-
ing valuations more like other areas of the law involving expert testimony is
really a good idea. As we have described, there is a considerable body of
scholarship dedicated to enumerating problems with expert bias and the
susceptibility of fact finders to facially persuasive yet factually deficient
experts.195
These concerns are valid and will not be wholly resolved under our pro-
posal. But valuation cases are less susceptible to false findings of credibility
even as they may be more prone to the type of exaggeration that has resulted
in a system of judicial averaging. Valuation is also not an area where there is
190. Far from losing sight of their basic procedure, courts in cases involving scientific
testimony of a forensic or medical nature have been criticized for hewing too closely to a rules-
based understanding of the evidence before them. For example, they have been faulted for
“approach[ing] methodological questions as questions of law and case-specific applications of
these methods as questions of fact” because this leads them to admit faulty laboratory data in
particular cases and allow the fact finder to make the credibility determination rather than
screening it out before it gets to the fact finder. Murphy, supra note 189, at 757.
191. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 21, at 1126–36 (identifying problems with expert wit-
nesses, including litigants’ buying whatever opinion they need, the specialization of experts to
plaintiff or defense side, the phenomenon of the professional expert witness, the ability of
experts to become expert performers in court, the extensive preparation of experts by attor-
neys, lawyers who are ill equipped to conduct effective cross-exanimation, juries who are awed
by expert credentials).
192. Id. at 1121–24 (describing failures of judges to see through incorrect scientific
testimony).
193. Mnookin, Future of Forensic Science, supra note 189, at 1226 (“[I]n court, until quite
recently, experts frequently testified that their technique had a ‘zero error rate.’ ”).
194. For a discussion of the problems with expert corruption and lawyer inadequacy as
well as “the essential paradox in the use of expert evidence”—that experts testify about matters
“beyond the ordinary understanding of lay people” yet “we ask lay judges and jurors to judge
their testimony”—see Gross, supra note 21, at 1182.
195. See, e.g., id. at 1135; Mnookin, Expert Evidence, supra note 189; Murphy, supra note
189, at 757.
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judicial resistance to science. In this way, it differs from inquiries such as
fingerprinting. There, judges have consistently ignored a National Academy
of Sciences Report that found both the science behind fingerprint analysis
and the way it is generally conducted in this country are deeply flawed.196 In
addition, complex valuation cases typically do not involve the kind of re-
source imbalances that leave vacuums of expertise on the defense side in
criminal cases. One side is unlikely to be without the resources to secure a
good expert in a high-stakes valuation case.197 Thus, these are cases in which
our system’s reliance on the lay, bankruptcy, or tax judge should be re-
warded with probing scrutiny of experts such that the experts become more
rational rather than more polished.
For example, an expert in a fingerprinting case might be inclined to
inflate her certainty of a match in order to seem more credible,198 while in a
valuation case, an expert will seem more credible if her estimates are less
inflated and closer to those offered by the other side. Furthermore, under
our proposal, a valuation expert who cannot defend her choices may find
that the judge simply chooses the valuation produced by the other side. Even
if the judge does not fully adopt the other side’s position, she is likely to
make fact-findings adverse to the expert’s client that will negatively impact
the final valuation. In turn, the expert’s incentives will shift, reducing the
effects of bias on expert opinions. As a final bonus, implementation of our
196. See United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
district court properly admitted latent fingerprint analysis under Daubert’s reliability stan-
dards); Comm. on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sci. Cmty., Nat’l Research
Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward
(2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf (finding serious
flaws and a lack of standardization in fingerprint analysis and finding a lack of uniformity or
standards for the credentialing of fingerprint examiners); Mnookin, Future of Forensic Science,
supra note 189, at 1234–41 (describing the findings of the NAS report and courts’ continued
insistence on admitting fingerprint evidence).
197. Resource disparities have received much attention in the context of criminal trials.
See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public
Choice Theory, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 219, 231 n.48 (2004) (collecting evidence of spending differen-
tials between the government and defendants). In contexts in which large amounts of money
are involved, such as the mass tort arena, however, there has been a shift toward cooperation
between plaintiffs’ lawyers that has leveled the financial playing field. See Peter H. Schuck,
Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 941, 956 (1995)
(“[P]laintiffs’ lawyers have established clearinghouses that help coordinate the exchange of
legal briefs, depositions, information on expert witnesses, and other types of costly litigation
resources—cooperation that partly reflects the interdependence of mass tort claims values . . . .
”).
198. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger & Lawrence M. Solan, The Uneasy Relationship Between
Science and Law: An Essay and Introduction, 73 Brook. L. Rev. 847, 850–51 (2008) (“Much of
contemporary science involves researchers hypothesizing about natural phenomena and offer-
ing tentative explanations that become the subject of further research, which results in both
refinements and broad challenges.”); Frank C. Keil, Getting to the Truth: Grounding Incomplete
Knowledge, 73 Brook. L. Rev. 1035, 1042 (2008) (describing the confidence-inflating effect in
a study in which students found it much more difficult to tell the good from the bad explana-
tions when they contained fMRI results, even though the fMRI results were completely
noninformative).
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proposal will encourage more experts to participate in litigation by improv-
ing the actual and perceived legitimacy of the process. This will enhance the
quality of expert testimony in general.199 Thus, experts will be more reliable
sources of information.
The strongest objection to refocusing around expert opinions in valua-
tion cases may be that judges in those cases will make the kind of credibility
mistakes that seem to occur so often in cases involving scientific testi-
mony.200 It is true that fact finders will get credibility determinations wrong
in some cases, blinded by a suave demeanor or a fancy spreadsheet. While
credibility mistakes are an unavoidable byproduct of any system that relies
on witnesses, however, they will not have the same costs as arbitrary judicial
valuations. First, for the reasons described above, they will be less likely to
occur in valuation cases than in cases involving more complex scientific tes-
timony. In addition, the current regime creates an incentive for witnesses to
present the most extreme valuation that will be tolerated. By contrast, mis-
takes in credibility, if they are unpredictable and relatively infrequent, do not
create incentives for the parties to move to the extremes. At most, the poten-
tial for credibility mistakes gives parties with weak claims an incentive to
litigate if they think there is a high enough chance of a mistake. But litigants
hoping for a mistake still have the incentive to appear as credible as possible.
When faced with a judge with some ability to probe behind the numbers (or
at least to spot a red flag when the experts present wildly deviating num-
bers), the incentive to appear credible will lead litigants to hire the most
knowledgeable rather than the most polished expert. Furthermore, unless
the credibility errors are exaggerated by fraud, incompetence, or institu-
tional flaws, they are unlikely to undermine legitimacy in the same way as
arbitrary judgments.
Finally, throughout this Article we have discussed the role of the judge
as fact finder. We have done so both for simplicity and because most com-
plex valuation cases do not involve juries. Tort cases are the most frequent
exception to that rule. Our argument applies with equal force to juries.
There is no difference in theory between how a judge, as opposed to a jury,
should conduct fact-finding in a valuation case—although it is obviously
harder to know how a jury has reached its conclusion. In practice there may
be other factors to consider. The biases of jurors and judges may differ. And
the dynamic of jury deliberations where jurors disagree on which expert is
credible may require further consideration as well as adjustments such as
more extensive jury instructions and additional bifurcation of trials (some
of which happens already in complex tort cases). We leave the elaboration of
those mechanisms to future work.
199. See Gross, supra note 21, at 1135 (“[S]ome of the best experts in many fields have a
contempt for legal proceedings that goes beyond the low regard for law and lawyers that is
common in our society. . . . As a result, these experts refuse to be witnesses . . . . ”).
200. See, e.g., id. at 1124 n.39 (describing extensive, yet incorrect, credibility findings by
district court in process of explaining his belief in plaintiffs’ expert in birth defect suit whose
outcome was later criticized as scientifically groundless).
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Conclusion
Through inattention to basic legal principles and the false conviction
that valuation is art not science, the judicial system has embraced a singular
approach to complex valuations. Scholars and courts have focused exten-
sively on two questions: (1) whether advocate expert testimony should be
part of the system at all; and (2) how to screen experts for qualification to
testify if they are part of the system. But little real attention has been paid to
the question of what to do with the expert testimony when experts do take
the stand. Litigants and courts have intuited a fundamental difference be-
tween how to credit evidence offered by experts and lay witnesses—espe-
cially in the valuation context. This intuition that valuation evidence must
be treated differently in practice is wrong. It has no grounding in doctrine
and little theoretic reasoning to commend it.
By focusing on the simple idea that valuations are enterprises in fact-
finding and that the values being sought correspond to best practices for
valuation by experts in the field, this Article offers a new understanding of
the valuation problem. What we are witnessing is, in an important sense, a
simple procedural breakdown, not—as others have argued—a failure cre-
ated by dueling experts that must be cured through blinding the experts,
using court-appointed experts, or instructing judges to apply a specific
mathematical formula to expert testimony in every case. Because valuation
invokes the fact-finding function of the judicial process in order to identify
clearly established values, procedural and evidentiary mechanisms that pro-
tect the integrity of fact-finding must be enforced. The integral requirement
that the facts that ground a judgment appear in the record and the eviden-
tiary rules that structure how those facts appear must not be forgotten. We
contend that those rules are being ignored and that adhering to them would
produce principled outcomes, legitimacy, and valuable certainty.
